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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ANABASIS, INC., ) 
Case No. 20000832-CA 
Petitioner Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, ) 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
APPEALS BOARD, ) 
Priority No. 14 
Respondent Appellee. ) 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW OF DECISION OF UTAH LABOR 
COMMISSION BOARD OF APPEALS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this 
matter pursuant to Section 34A-l-303(6), Utah Code 
Annotated. "[T]he court of appeals has jurisdiction 
to: (a) review, reverse, remand, or annul any order 
of the . . . [Utah Labor Commission] Appeals Board." 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Utah Labor Commission correctly 
interpreted and applied the law in concluding it could 
impose a penalty for past noncompliance under § 34A-2-
211(2), Utah Workers' Compensation Act, after Anabasis 
obtained workers' compensation insurance. The relevant 
part of § 34A-2-211(2) provides for "a penalty . . . 
if . . . an employer . . . is conducting business 
1 
without securing" workers' compensation insurance. 
Citation to record showing issue preserved in 
administrative agency. Answer To Notice Of 
Noncompliance And Intent To Assess Penalty dated 
February 16, 1999 (Addendum 4a, R. 20). Anabasis' 
Appeal And Request For Hearing On Determination And 
Order Declaring Noncompliance And Assessing A Penalty 
dated March 28, 1999, ff2, 14, 18 & 19 (Addendum 10, 
13, R. 3, 4). Reply Brief Of Anabasis, dated August 
13, 1999, page 5 (Addendum 29, R. 43). Anabasis' 
Motion For Review dated May 5, 2000 (Addendum 37-39, 
R. 56-58). 
Standard of review. The correction of error 
standard of review applies, giving no deference to the 
administrative agency's decision. Cathco v. Valentine 
Crane Brunjes Onyon Architect, 944 P.2d 365, 367 (Utah 
1977). This case involves an agency-specific statute, 
but no administrative agency expertise or policy-
making power is required to interpret the statute. 
"In matters of pure statutory interpretation, an 
appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for 
correctness and gives no deference to its legal 
conclusions." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 
935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997)(citing State v. Vigil, 
842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992)). "[0]ur primary goal is 
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to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of 
the purpose of the statute was meant to achieve. . • . 
We therefore look first to the statute's plain 
language." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 
1998). The Utah Administrative Procedures Act § 63-
46b-16(4)(d) provides in part: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only 
iff on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: . . . (d) the agency has 
erroneously interpreted or applied the law. 
Nucor Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 
(Utah 1992); Morton Int'lf Inc. v. State Tax Comm'nf 
814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991); Sierra Club v. Utah 
Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 355, 344 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement 
Bd., 929 P.2d 1112, 1114-15 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), 
affld, 956 P.2d 279 (Utah 1998). The facts of the 
case are not disputed. The only issue is whether the 
labor commission properly interpreted and applied an 
agency-specific statute, § 34A-2-211(2), Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act, where the labor commission has not 
been granted specific discretion to interpret or apply 
the statutory language. "This is a question of 
statutory construction" reviewed under a "correction 
of error" standard. Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. 
Industrial Comm'nf 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997). 
"[Q]uestions of statutory construction are matters of 
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law for the courts, and we . . . accord no deference 
to an administrative agency's interpretation." Chris 
and Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 
511, 513 (Utah 1990). "We review an agency's . . . 
application of statutes for correctness, unless the 
statute in question grants the agency discretion." 
Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Comrn'n, 888 P.2d 
707, 710 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
2. Whether the labor commission abused its 
discretion delegated to it by § 34A-2-211(2)(a) by not 
even exercising discretion, and by imposing a 
noncompliance penalty under the circumstances of 
Anabasis unknowingly having a gap in business 
insurance coverage and obtaining workers' compensation 
insurance soon after notice from the labor commission. 
Citation to record showing issue preserved in 
administrative agency. Anabasis' Appeal And Request 
For Hearing On Determination And Order Declaring 
Noncompliance And Assessing A Penalty dated March 28, 
1999f ff2, 6, 14 & 17 (Addendum 10, 11 12 & 13, R. 1, 
2, 3 & 4). Reply Brief Of Anabasis, dated August 13, 
1999, page 2, 6 & 7 (Addendum 29, 30 & 31, R. 40, 44 & 
45). Anabasis' Motion For Review dated May 5, 2000 
(Addendum 37-39, R. 56-58). 
Standard of review. The Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act § 63-46b-16(4)(i)&(iv) governs the 
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applicable standard of review for a formal 
adjudicative hearing. Obviously, more discretionary 
leeway should be given to administrative action when 
special agency expertise or rule-making power exists 
than when it does not. Case language does not appear 
to carefully articulate much difference between the 
standards of review where special agency expertise or 
rule-making power exists and when it does not. 
Anabasis claims no special agency expertise or policy-
making power should apply here, so the standard of 
review should be reasonableness and rationality with 
no deference given to the labor commission's decision. 
It has been said that reasonableness and rationality 
is the same as § 63-46b-16(4)(i) "abuse of the 
discretion" or § 63-46b-16(4)(iv) "otherwise arbitrary 
or capricious." Caporoz v. Labor Comm'n, 945 P.2d 
141, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "When the Legislature 
has granted an agency discretion to determine an 
issue, we review the agency's action for 
reasonableness." Caporoz at 143; see Cross v. Board 
of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). In Bernard v. Motor Vehicle Div.F 905 
P.2d 317, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) the reasonableness 
and rationality standard was applied where the 
administrative agency did not have special 
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discretionary expertise or rule-making power. The 
distinction between the two types of discretionary 
power is found in the amount of deference given the 
agency decisions, not in the "reasonableness and 
rationality" language used to describe the different 
standards of review. 
3. Whether Anabasis is entitled to reasonable 
attorney fees pursuant to the Small Business Equal 
Access to Justice Act § 78-27a-5. 
Standard of review. This issue is not here 
on review. Litigation expense awards are authorized in 
appeals from administrative decisions by § 78-27a-5. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable statutes and rules are set out by 
citation alone in the Table of Contentsf pages iv-v, 
and verbatim in the Addendum, pages 46-59. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
The labor commission determined Anabasis failed 
to provide workers• compensation insurance for its 
employees from November 2, 1988, to January 12, 1999, 
and ordered Anabasis to pay a $1,000 penalty to the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund. Anabasis seeks review of 
the entire Order Denying Motion For Review, dated 
August 30, 2000, made by the Appeals Board, Utah Labor 
Commission, affirming the Administrative Law Judge's 
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Order dated April 14, 2000, affirming the Accident 
Division's Order dated March 3f 1999, assessing a 
$1,000.00 penalty, Utah Labor Commission Case No. 
1981085827. (Addendum 40-45, R. 68-73.) Anabasis 
filed its Petition For Writ Of Review in this Court on 
September 28, 2000. 
B. Course of proceedings and dispositions by the 
labor commission. 
The first Notice of Noncompliance In Providing 
Workers' Compensation Insurance Coverage was made on 
January 6, 1999. (Addendum 1, R. 21.) 
The Notice Of Noncompliance And Intent To Assess 
Penalty, with a penalty computation attached thereto, 
was made on February 12, 1999. (Addendum 2-4, R. 14-15.) 
Determination And Order Declaring Noncompliance 
And Assessing A Penalty of $1,000 was made on March 3, 
1999. (Addendum 7-9, R. 16-18.) 
By labor commission letter dated March 3, 1999, 
Anabasis was informed, among other things: "Based on 
the above information and the fact there was no 
insurance in effect during the period penalized for by 
the commission the penalty will not be waived." 
(Addendum 5-6, R. 22-23.) There is another letter 
dated March 30, 1999, to the same effect. (Addendum 
15-16, R. 24-25.) 
On April 14, 2000, Findings Of Fact, Conclusions 
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Of Law And Order were made by Donald L. George, 
Administrative Law Judge, Utah Labor Commission, 
Adjudication Division, affirming the Determination And 
Order Declaring Noncompliance And Assessing A Penalty 
of $1,000 made March 3, 1999. (Addendum 32-36, R. 51-
55.) The matter was submitted to the Administrative 
Law Jude for decision on briefs and the record without 
sworn testimony. 
On August 30, 2000, the Order Denying Motion For 
Review was made by Appeals Board, Utah Labor 
Commission. (Addendum 40-45, R. 68-73.) 
C. Disposition at trial agency. 
The Appeals Board, Utah Labor Commission, made 
its Order Denying Motion For Review dated August 30, 
2000 (Addendum 40-45, R. 68-73), affirming the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order dated April 14, 2000 
(Addendum 32-36, R. 51-55), affirming the Accident 
Division's Order dated March 3, 1999 (Addendum 7-9, R. 
16-18), assessing a $1,000.00 penalty. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Findings Of Fact set out in The Appeals 
Board, Utah Labor Commission, Order Denying Motion For 
Review dated August 30, 2000 (Addendum 40-45, R. 68-
73), are not substantially disputed, as follows: 
Anabasis has been in business for several years and 
has had employees during that time. Anabasis obtained 
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a policy of workers' compensation insurance effective 
February 1, 1999. On February 12, 1999, the labor 
commission imposed a $lf000 penalty against Anabasis 
for failure to maintain coverage from November 2, 
1998, to January 12, 1999. 
The following undisputed facts are in the 
recordf but not set out in the above findings. 
Anabasis thought it had all necessary business 
insurance. Anabasis did not know it had a gap in 
business insurance coverage and obtained workers' 
compensation insurance soon after receiving notice of 
noncompliance from the labor commission. (Addendum 
11, f6, R. 1-5.) 
ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The labor commission is not authorized to impose 
a penalty for past noncompliance when the employer has 
workers' compensation insurance under § 34A-2-211(2), 
which provides, in relevant part: "[T]he division may 
impose a penalty . . . if the division believes that 
an employer of one or more employees is. conducting 
business without securing'' workers' compensation 
insurance. (Emphasis added.) In analyzing the statute 
in Point I, Anabasis looks first to the labor 
commission's interpretation; then its plain language; 
its intended purposes; special agency expertise or 
9 
policy-making power; and finally, reasonableness and 
rationality. Point II discusses the exercise of 
administrative agency discretion. Point III discusses 
attorney fees pursuant to the Small Business Equal 
Access to Justice Act, § 78-27a-l, et seg. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 34A-2-211 OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
ACT IS NOT AMBIGUOUS, AND NEEDS NO 
INTERPRETATION 
The standard of review is set forth above at 
Statement Of Issues, Standards Of Review. 
A. The labor commission's interpretation. 
Marshalling grounds for statutory interpretation 
of § 34A-2-211, Workers' Compensation Act, most 
favorably to the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board's 
conclusions, it is noted: "The statute should be read 
as a whole." Cathco v. Valentine Crane Brunjes Onyon 
Architect, 944 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah 1977) and Andrus v. 
Allred, 404 P.2d 972 (Utah 1965), 17 Utah 2.d 106, 
109, are cited by the Appeals Board in its Discussion 
And Conclusions Of Law, at pages 3 & 4. (Addendum 42-
43, R. 70-71). Some references to "the period of 
noncompliance" are made in subsections of 34A-2-211. 
The Appeals Broad concluded: 
The language of §34A-2-211(2), when read as a 
whole and in light of its intended purpose, 
indicates its operation is not confined only 
to continuing violations, but also applies to 
10 
instances of past violations. 
(Appeals Board Discussion And Conclusions Of Law, page 
4, Addendum 43, R. 71.) 
B. Section 34A-2-211 should be interpreted 
according to its plain language. 
"In interpreting a statute, the court must look 
first to its plain language.'' Valcarce v. Fitzgeraldf 
961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998). Section 34A-2-211 of 
the workers' compensation act is not ambiguous, and 
needs no interpretation. 
Here, as in other cases, ' [w]hen faced with a 
question of statutory construction, we look 
first to the plain language of the statute.' 
Under our rules of statutory construction, we 
need not look beyond the plain language of 
this provision unless we find some ambiguity 
in it. (Citations omitted.) 
V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 942 P.2d 906, 916 
(Utah 1996). Anabasis submits "is conducting a 
business" is not ambiguous when reading the statute in 
whole or in part. The labor commission's 
interpretation is not correct if the plain language 
analysis is applied to statutory construction. 
C. Interpreting the statute according to its 
intended purposes. 
Notwithstanding its plain language, the Labor 
Commission Appeals Board concluded the statute was 
ambiguous and needed interpretation by looking at its 
intended purpose. A discussion of the role of 
legislative purpose in statutory construction follows. 
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1. Plain language is the best evidence of 
legislative intent. 
In Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah 
1965) the Supreme Court said: 
[0]ne of the fundamental rules of statutory 
construction is that the statute should be 
looked at as a whole and in the light of the 
general purpose it was intended to serve; and 
should be so interpreted and applied as to 
accomplish that objective. 
Andrus involved unique facts under the Guest Statute 
later declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court 
observed that statutory hair splitting was not an 
appropriate way to apply the law, and pointed out the 
usefulness of looking at the purpose of a statute in 
interpreting it. 
Arguments were made before the labor commission 
whether the purpose of § 34A-2-211(2) is compliance, 
punishment, revenue generation, or a combination of 
purposes. The Workers' Compensation Act contains no 
purpose clause. The Act needs no general purpose 
clause because its proverbial purpose is to secure 
workers' compensation insurance for workers. The 
issue on appeal is the specific intent and purpose of 
§ 34A-2-211(2) in carrying out the general purpose of 
the Act. This specific subsection requires compliance, 
imposes a penalty for noncompliance, and deposits the 
penalty in the Uninsured Employers1 Fund. Therefore, 
12 
Anabasis concludes there are three factors to consider 
in interpreting the intent and purpose of the 
subsection; which are compliance, punishment, and 
revenue generation. These are not conflicting factorsf 
nor does one factor carry more weight than another. 
All factors should be applied in maximum harmony with 
the whole Act and the plain statutory language 
expressing the factors. The labor commission 
emphasizes two factors at the expense of one factor, 
thereby doing violence to the plain language and 
harmonious application of the subsection with the 
whole Act. By emphasizing some factors more than 
another factor the labor commission is carrying out 
its policy rather than the legislature's policy. 
There is no express or implied statutory indication 
that one factor should be given more weight than 
another. The labor commission's limited interpretation 
gives the subsection less scope than intended by 
inhibiting compliance with penalties. There is no 
compelling reason to ignore the pain language of the 
statute. A penalty for existing noncompliance is a 
salutary incentive to comply. This is not a criminal-
like statute requiring a penalty for past 
noncompliance. Revenue generation should not be 
considered its main purpose merely because the penalty 
"shall be deposited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund." 
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Section 34A-2-211(3). Requiring employers to provide 
workers' compensation insurance is as important as 
funding the Uninsured Employers' Fund with penalties. 
The purpose of § 34A-2-211(2) is to obtain and 
maintain compliance before a workers' compensation 
claim is made. The best insurance is a policy in 
effect when a claim is made. Penalizing past 
noncompliance does not necessarily enhance present 
compliance. A penalty does not help an employer pay 
the premium for workers' compensation insurance. 
Penalizing present noncompliance enhances compliance, 
and carries out the compliance purpose of the statute. 
A "statute should be construed in harmony with 
the legislative intent and . . . its plain language is 
the best evidence of legislative intent." Cathco v. 
Valentine Crane Brunjes Onyon Architect, 944 P.2d 365, 
369 (Utah 1977). If the plain language of the stature 
carries out its intended purpose, then the statute 
should be applied as written, without statutory 
construction to expand and enlarge its coverage 
outside its plain meaning. Purpose is used for 
statutory interpretation. Interpretation need not be 
used to determine purpose. The labor commission tries 
to expand and enlarge the statutory purpose by 
interpreting an unambiguous statute; and then use the 
14 
expanded and enlarged purpose to interpret the 
statuter contrary to its plain wording. Such a daisy 
chain exercise is condemned by Andrus. 
It appears from the record that the labor 
commission argued what the statute should mean, rather 
than what its words do mean. The labor commission 
seems to argue that its interpretation makes better 
law than Anabasis' interpretation. Like well-
instructed juries, we should not be concerned with the 
wisdom of any law, but we should be concerned with our 
own wisdom in applying the law. Discussing the merits 
of a statute is not productive because statutes vary 
from good, bad, to indifferent, depending on 
individual points of view. Discussing the merits of a 
law leaves no time to apply it. 
2. The labor commission's interpretation carries 
out an unauthorized administrative agency policy to 
punish and generate revenue. 
The record shows the labor commission imposed 
the penalty to carry out an administrative agency 
policy of punishing employers subject to its 
regulatory powerf and a policy to raise revenue for 
its Uninsured Employers' Fund with penalties. The 
labor commission emphasized punitive and revenue 
generating purposes of § 34A-2-211. The labor 
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commission claimed, "The very nature of a penalty is 
to punish." Alsof "it is clear the legislature 
intended the penalty to accommodate and compensate the 
fund [Uninsured Employers' Fund, § 34A-2-704] for 
paying out compensation for uninsured employers for 
those period of noncompliance, regardless of whether 
or not an employer is currently insured." (Brief Of 
Industrial Accidents Division & Closing Arguments, 
dated July 26, 1999, page 4, citing § 34A-2-417. 
(Addendum 20, R. 34.) Penalties are deposited to the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund pursuant to § 34A-2-210(3). 
Anabasis claims the plain language shows the purpose 
of § 34A-2-211(2) is remedial and compliance oriented. 
The statute is hard on employers who do not remedy 
violations, and lenient for those who do remedy 
violations. 
Other consequences and risks for past non-
compliance, not at issue in this case, can be severe 
and are dealt with elsewhere in the Act. Therefore, 
noncomplying employers do not get off scot-free by 
waiting until a § 34A-2-211 penalty is threatened 
before complying. 
3. The labor commission's interpretation gives 
different meanings to the same words in consecutive 
sections. 
Anabasis can find nothing in the whole Act 
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suggesting "is conducting" means "was conducting." 
The Appeals Board cites nothing to support its 
conclusion that its interpretation of the statute is 
supported by the "light of its intended purpose." 
Order Denying Motion For Review, dated August 30, 
2000f page 4. (Addendum 43, R. 71.) 
All references to "is conducting business," "is 
conducting a business," "the period of noncompliance" 
and "purpose" in §§ 34A-2-210 and 34A-2-211 are 
highlighted below; and lend no support to the labor 
commission's interpretation. 
34A-2-210. Power to bring suit for 
noncompliance. 
* * * * * * 
(2) If the division has reason to believe that 
an employer is conducting a business without 
securing the payment of compensation in one of 
the three ways provided in Section 34A-2-201, 
the division may give the employer five days 
written notice by registered mail of the 
noncompliance and if the employer within the 
five days written notice does not remedy the 
default: 
(a) the commission or the division on 
behalf of the commission may file suit under 
Subsection (1); and 
(b) the court may, ex parte, issue without 
bond a temporary injunction restraining the 
further operation of the employer's business 
until the payment of these benefits has been 
secured by the employer as required by Section 
34A-2-201. 
34A-2-211. Notice of noncompliance to employer -
- Enforcement power of division — Penalty. 
(1) (a) In addition to the remedies specified 
in Section 34A-2-210, if the division has 
reason to believe that an employer is 
conducting business without securing the 
payment of benefits in one of the three ways 
provided in Section 34A-2-201, the division 
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may give that employer written notice of the 
noncompliance by certified mail to the last-
known address of the employer. 
* * * * * 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the 
division may impose a penalty against the 
employer under this Subsection (2): 
* * * * * 
(ii) if the division believes that an 
employer of one or more employees is 
conducting business without securing the 
payment of benefits in one of the three ways 
provided in Section 34A-2-201. 
(b) The penalty imposed under Subsection 
(2)(a) shall be the greater of: 
(i) $1,000; or 
(ii) three times the amount of the 
premium the employer would have paid for 
workers' compensation insurance based on the 
rate filing of the Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah during the period of noncompliance. 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (2)(b)(ii), 
the premium is calculated by applying rates 
and rate multipliers to the payroll basis 
under Subsection (2)(d), using the highest 
rated employee class code applicable to the 
employer's operations. 
(d) The payroll basis for the purpose of 
calculating the premium penalty shall be 150% 
of the state's average weekly wage multiplied 
by the highest number of workers employed by 
the employer during the period of the 
employer's noncompliance multiplied by the 
number of weeks of the employer's 
noncompliance up to a maximum of 156 weeks. 
(3) The penalty imposed under Subsection (2) 
shall be deposited in the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund created by Section 34A-2-704 and used for 
the purposes of that fund. 
(Highlights added.) 
Anabasis submits the meaning of "is conducting a 
business" and "is conducting business" is the same in 
§§ 34A-2-210 and 34A-2-211, but different if the labor 
commission's interpretation is used. Section 34A-2-
210(2)(a)(b) allows the labor commission to file suit 
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and obtain "a temporary injunction restraining the 
further operation of the employer's business until the 
payment of these benefits has been secured by the 
employer as required by Section 34A-2-201," only if "the 
division has reason to believe that an employer is 
conducting a business without" workersf compensation 
insurance. (All emphasis added.) There is no reason to 
obtain an injunction against noncompliance after there 
is compliance, regardless of "past noncompliance." 
Therefore, the § 34A-2-210 meaning of "is conducting a 
business" necessarily means what it says, without 
ambiguity or need of interpretation. Reading the 
statute as a whole indicates "is conducting a 
business" in § 34A-2-210 means the same as "is 
conducting business" in § 34A-2-211. That is to say, 
the labor commission may seek an injunction or impose 
a penalty for noncompliance if the employer is 
conducting business without workers' compensation 
insurance at the time the injunction is sought or the 
penalty is imposed. The labor commission's 
interpretation gives different meanings to the same 
words in consecutive sections. The relationship of 
consecutive sections should be examined in interpreting 
a statute. A "statute should be construed as a whole, 
with all of its provisions construed to be harmonious 
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with each other." Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 
P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995). 
4. The labor commission has no special agency 
expertise or agency policy-making power to interpret 
the language in question. 
There is no reason to interpret statutory 
language which is not ambiguous in whole or in part. 
Although § 34A-2-211 is an agency-specific statute, no 
special agency expertise or agency policy-making power 
is required to interpret the language in question. 
Knowing if and when an employer has workers' 
compensation insurance does not require expertise or 
the exercise of policy. Nor does knowing if and when 
the labor commission may impose a noncompliance 
penalty require expertise or the exercise of policy. 
The labor commission may impose a noncompliance 
penalty if and when the employer is not in compliance 
with the Act. What constitutes compliance in unusual 
situations may require some agency expertise or the 
exercise of administrative policy, but determining the 
date when compliance is obtained to the satisfaction 
of the labor commission does not. An employer simply 
complies or not on a specific date to the satisfaction 
of labor commission administrative standards. No 
penalty for past noncompliance may be imposed after 
compliance. If "is conducting business without 
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securing" workers' compensation insurance means what 
it saysf Anabasis cannot be fined for noncompliance 
because it had insurance when fined. 
5. The labor commission's interpretation does 
not meet the deferential reasonableness and 
rationality standard applicable when an administration 
agency does have discretionary or policy-making power. 
Section 32A-2-211 read alone and with the whole 
Act is not ambiguous. The only permissible reading of 
the § 32A-2-211 is the labor commission has no 
authority, express or implied, to interpret when to 
impose a penalty. No matter how much discretionary 
power or policy-making power the labor commission may 
have under the Actf its interpretation of § 32A-2-211 
does not meet the deferential reasonableness and 
rationality standard of the cases cited in the 
standard of review because its interpretation does 
violence to the plain language and intent of the 
statute. Deference to administrative discretion 
applies only when an administrative agency has special 
discretionary expertise or rule-making power. Bernard 
v. Motor Vehicle Div.f 905 P.2d 317, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
POINT II 
THE LABOR COMMISSION DID NOT EXERCISE 
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AS REQUIRED BY 
SECTION 34A-2-211 OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
ACT 
The standard of review is set forth above at 
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Statement Of Issues, Standards Of Review. 
Support for the labor commission's claim it 
exercised discretion is marshalled as follows. The 
Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board found "the basis 
for the Division's imposition of penalty against 
Anabasis has been set forth in the orders of the 
Division and the ALJ [administrative law judge], as 
well as in this decision." Order Denying Motion For 
Review, dated August 30, 2000, page 4. (Addendum 43, 
R. 71.) Apparently the Utah Labor Commission Appeals 
Board is referring to its finding of fact, at page 2, 
that "The salon has been in business for several years 
and has had employees during that time." The 
administrative law judge mentioned the fact that "It 
is undisputed that Anabasis had employees during the 
period in question from November 2f 1998 through 
January 12, 1999, but did not have workers 
compensation insurance in force during that period." 
Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order, page 
1. (Addendum 32f R. 51.) And at page 4, "Anabasis 
has not provided any case law that would allow the 
Division, the Administrative Law Judge, or the labor 
commission to impose, reduce, or suspend that $1,000 
penalty. Accordingly, the penalty is affirmed." The 
Utah Labor Commission Appeals board implied, in a 
footnote, that the penalty could have been higher if a 
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longer penalty period had been used. Order Denying 
Motion For Review, page 2, footnote 2. (Addendum 41, 
f. 2, R. 69.) The penalty period applied is not 
disputed, nor is it claimed a shorter penalty period 
was used as an exercise of discretion. The penalty 
period is not an issue on appeal. (Incidentally, 
footnote 1 on the same page refers to two to six 
employees. Anabasis had only one or two employees at 
a time, but this is not an issue on appeal either.) 
While it is true Anabasis did not provide "any 
case law that would allow . . . the Labor Commission 
to . . . suspend that $1,000 penalty," Anabasis did 
cite § 34A-2-211(2)(a)(ii), for which counsel finds no 
applicable case law on the subject. The labor 
commission made no specific finding as to the 
sufficiency of Anabasis' claim that it thought it had, 
and had good reason to believe it had, full business 
insurance coverage, and did not know it had an 
insurance gap until notified by the labor commission. 
This claim was made in Anabasis' Appeal And Request 
For Hearing On Determination And Order Declaring 
Noncompliance And Assessing A Penalty dated March 28, 
1999, ff6 & 17 (Addendum 11, 13, R. 2, 4), and 
Anabasis' Motion For Review dated May 5, 2000, at 
pages 2 & 3 (Addendum 38-39, R. 57-58). Business 
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cannot be conducted without reliance on many agents, 
including insurance agents. It is reasonable to 
expect an insurance agent to comply with a request to 
provide full business insurance coverage, which 
includes workers' compensation insurance, or at least 
inform the business it needs such insurance. This 
point was made in the above mentioned pleadings. 
Whether this is a sufficient excuse in the exercise of 
sound administrative discretion is a decision for the 
labor commission to make in the first instance. The 
administrative agency should explain its discretionary 
decisions in its findings. The labor commission 
should have made a finding specifically addressing 
this claim, explaining why the Anabasis' excuse was, 
or was not, sufficient in weighing discretionary 
factors. The legislature did not intend to impose a 
penalty in all cases, regardless of meritorious 
exceptions. While Anabasis should not expect 
elaborate, detailed, and total technical correctness 
in findings, a reasonable defense should not be 
ignored in findings regarding discretionary decisions. 
While the imposition of penalty is 
discretionary with the Industrial Accidents 
Division, the amount of penalty is fixed by 
the foregoing statute and cannot be altered. 
Order Denying Motion For Review, dated August 30, 
2000, page 3, citing § 34A-2-211(2), which provides, 
in part: 
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The penalty imposed under Subsection (2)(a) 
shall be the greater of: 
(i) $1,000; or 
(ii) three times the amount of the premium 
the employer would have paid for workers' 
compensation insurance . . . 
Anabasis claims the record shows the labor 
commission does not, did not, and never will, exercise 
discretion in imposing a § 34A-2-211(2) penalty. 
Anabasis also argues that an inadequate 
factual basis exists to support the Division's 
exercise of discretion in penalizing Anabasis. 
The Appeals Board finds no merit to this 
argument. To the contrary, the basis for the 
Division's imposition of penalty against 
Anabasis have been set forth in the orders of 
the Division and the ALJ [Administrative Law 
Judge], as well as in this decision. 
Furthermore, Anabasis does not challenge any 
of the facts on which the penalty is based. 
Under the circumstances, there has been no 
abuse of discretion in the imposition of 
penalty against Anabasis pursuant to §34A~2-
211(2). 
Order Denying Motion For Review, dated August 30, 
2000, page 4. (Addendum 43, R. 71.) The claim that 
the labor commission never has waived the penalty is 
supported by the record, quoted at some length below. 
The abuse of administrative discretion is in the labor 
commission not exercising discretion at all. Instead, 
the labor commission has a set and standard policy not 
to waive the penalty. In the Reply Brief Of Anabasis, 
dated August 13, 1999, page 5 (Addendum 29, R. 43), 
Anabasis objected to the labor commission's policy on 
exercising administrative discretion under § 34A-2-
211, as follows: 
At the hearing the administrative law judge 
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stated there appears to be some evidence that 
the Labor Commission exercised discretion in 
deciding to impose a penalty. That finding 
should be reconsidered in light of the Labor 
Commission's assertion to the contrary in its 
brief. "The Division has exercised its 
discretion simply by its act of imposing a 
penalty in this matter . . . Although the 
Division vehemently disagrees with 
Respondent's arguments in this regard, the 
fact that the Division chose to penalize for 
[a specific time period] is also an exercise 
of discretion." (Br. p 6.) [Brief Of 
Industrial Accidents Division & Closing 
Arguments, dated July 26, 1999. (Addendum 22, 
R. 36).] That is not an exercise of 
administrative discretion. That is a 
"vehement" statement of policy not to exercise 
discretion. The Labor Commission's "vehement" 
statement of policy reasonably leads counsel 
to assume it has never exercised, and will 
never exercise, its discretion to not 
penalize, or to reduce the penalty, in 
appropriate circumstances calling for the 
sound exercise of administrative discretion as 
required by the statute. Anabasis submits 
that a finding the Labor Commission exercised 
its discretion cannot be reasonably made in 
light of the Labor Commission's "vehement" 
statement of policy to the contrary. 
Also, in Anabasis' Motion For Review, dated May 5, 
2000, 12, page 2, (Addendum 38, R. 57): 
2. The administrative law judge erred in not 
making a finding of fact or conclusion of law 
that the Division exercised discretion. The 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
not adequate to support the penalty part of 
the order. The conclusion that "The choice to 
impose a penalty or not, is in fact a 
discretionary act" is an interpretation of the 
statute. It is not a finding of fact that the 
Division did an act amounting to such 
exercise, nor is it a conclusion of law that 
discretion was exercised by such act. A 
finding of fact or conclusion of law that the 
Division properly exercised discretion cannot 
be made because the Division never has and 
never will exercise discretion, its policy 
being stated in its Brief dated July 26, 1999 
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[Brief Of Industrial Accidents Division & 
Closing Arguments. (Addendum 22, R. 36.)] 
"The Division has exercised its discretion 
simply by its act of imposing a penalty in 
this matter . . . Although the Division 
vehemently disagrees with Respondent's 
arguments in this regard, the fact that the 
Division chose to penalize for [a specific 
time period] is also an exercise of 
discretion." (Br. p. 6.) [Brief Of 
Industrial Accidents Division & Closing 
Arguments. (Addendum 22, R. 36.)] Always 
imposing the maximum penalty all the time is 
an exercise of policy not an exercise of 
discretion, and is contrary to law. The 
division may not refuse to exercise discretion 
under the statute. There are facts in the 
record justifying an exercise of discretion. 
Anabasis reasonably believed it had purchased 
full business insurance coverage and was 
unaware of this gap in coverage until notified 
by the division. The administrative law judge 
found that no workers compensation claim has 
ever been made against Anabasis. The Labor 
Commission makes the dubious argument that the 
purpose of the law is to generate revenue in 
its Brief dated July 26, 1999, page 4. [Brief 
Of Industrial Accidents Division & Closing 
Arguments. (Addendum 20, R. 42.)] Any claim 
the Division ever exercises discretion should 
be viewed with enormous skepticism. The 
administrative law judge is in error in 
stating "Anabasis has not provided any case 
law that would allow the Division, the 
Administrative Law Judge, or the Labor 
Commission to impose, reduce, or suspend that 
$1,000 penalty." Anabasis did not cite case 
law because it cited statutory law, 
specifically "the division may impose a 
penalty" at § 34A-2-211(2) (a) . Case law is 
not necessary to understand the word "may" 
means discretionary. 
There is no applicable case law on § 34A-2-211(2)(a). 
The appropriate remedy for an administrative 
abuse of discretion based on unauthorized agency 
policy should be reversal of the agency's decision, 
not merely referring the matter back to make 
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additional pro forma findings of fact. Referral back 
for additional findings is not a credible process when 
the agency has a history of exercising a policy it is 
not authorized to make. The evidence in the record is 
clear, uncontroverted and supports the Anabasis' claim 
that the labor commission has a firmly fixed policy 
not to waive the penalty. Remanding the case for more 
adequate findings will not add value to this review. 
POINT III 
ANABASIS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
Standard of review. This issue is not here on 
review. 
Litigation expense awards are authorized in 
appeals from administrative decisions by § 78-27a-5. 
"This court has interpreted attorney fee statutes 
broadly so as to award attorney fees on appeal where a 
statute initially authorizes them." Salmon v. Davis 
County, 916 P.2d 890f 895 (Utah 1996). 
Anabasis asks the Court of Appeals to award 
attorney fees pursuant to the Small Business Equal 
Access to Justice Act, § 78-27a-l, et seg. 
78-27a-5. Litigation expense award authorized 
in appeals from administrative decisions. 
(1) In any civil judicial appeal taken 
from an administrative decision regarding a 
matter in which the administrative action was 
commenced by the state, and which involves the 
business regulatory functions of the state, a 
court may award reasonable litigation expenses 
to any small business which is a named party 
if the small business prevails in the appeal 
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and the court finds that the state action was 
undertaken without substantial justification. 
Section 78-27a-5, authorizing an attorney fees 
award to a small business on appeal, is not the same 
as § 78-27-56, authorizing sanctions including an 
award of attorney fees in civil actions for bad faith. 
The differences are § 78-27a-5 provides the Court "may 
award reasonable litigation expenses" on appeal if the 
"court finds the state action was undertaken without 
substantial justificationf" while § 78-27-6 provides 
the Court "shall award reasonable attorney's fees . . . 
if the court determines that the action or defense to 
the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith." (All emphasis added.) 
If this is viewed as a distinction without a 
difference, then the Small Business Equal Access to 
Justice Act is merely a euphemism making § 78-27-6 bad 
faith sanctions available to hapless small businesses 
abused by unreasonable administrative action. 
Anabasis submits that the sanctions authorized by § 
78-27-6 and Utah Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 
11(c)(1)(A), apply generally to all litigation, 
including this case. Rule 11 uses the word 
"sanctions." Section 78-27-6 is worded in sanctions 
language. The Small Business Equal Access to Justice 
Act is worded like an attorney fees clause. The Small 
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Business Equal Access to Justice Act § 78-27a-5 
requires "substantial justification" for undertaking 
state administrative action. Undertaking state action 
with merely some justification is not acceptable under 
§ 78-27a-5, while a litigant, and its attorney, avoids 
sanction if there is some justification under § 78-27-
6 and Rule 11(c)(1)(A). Substantial justification and 
some justification is a distinction with a difference. 
Anabasis submits § 78-27a-5 is a genuine attorney fees 
clause authorizing the Appeals Court to award attorney 
fees when the administrative action was taken with 
merely some justification, if any at all, but short of 
"substantial justification." 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, containing the words "shall award," is a 
sanctions rule similar to Rule 11(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, containing the word "may." The 
standards of Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P.; Rule 33, Utah 
R. App. P.; and § 78-27-6 should not apply to the 
Small Business Equal Access to Justice Act. Rule 
34(b) & (e), Utah R. App. P., allows "an award of 
costs for or against the state" or its agencies 
"unless specifically required or prohibited by law." 
Counsel is unaware of any such prohibition. Counsel 
notes that the right of a small business to attorney 
fees under the Small Business Equal Access to Justice 
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Act does not appear to be reciprocal under the Act, or 
under § 78-27-56.5 which applies reciprocity to 
attorney fee clauses in "a civil action based upon any 
promissory notef written contract, or other writing." 
Pursuant to § 78-27a-3 the small business must 
prevail against the state to be awarded attorney fees. 
(1) "Prevail" means to obtain favorable final 
judgment, the right to all appeals having been 
exhausted, on the merits, on substantially all 
counts or charges in the action and with 
respect to the most significant issue or set 
of issues presented, but does not include the 
settlement of any action, either by 
stipulation, consent decree or otherwise, 
whether or not settlement occurs before or 
after any hearing or trial. 
(2) "Reasonable litigation expenses11 means 
court costs, administrative hearing costs, 
attorney's fees, and witness fees of all 
necessary witnesses, not in excess of $10,000, 
which a court finds were reasonably incurred 
in opposing action covered under this act. 
(3) "Small business" means a commercial or 
business entity, including a sole 
proprietorship, which does not have more than 
250 employees, . . . 
(4) "State" means any department, board, 
institution . . . of the state of Utah . . . 
Rule 4-505 of the Code Of Judicial 
Administration "shall govern the award of attorney 
fees in the trial courts." The Utah Court of Appeals 
is the trial court on a § 78-27a-5 attorney fees 
request. Counsel assumes a Rule 4-505 attorney fees 
request should be submitted by motion, notice and 
supporting affidavit, and if disputed, heard on the 
law and motion calendar, after the Court of Appeals 
first decides whether attorney fees may be awarded. 
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This is the same procedure used in District Courts. 
Counsel can find no rule authorizing a party to 
initially seek this relief in its brief; however, Rule 
33(c)(1), Utah R. App. P., allows a sanctions request 
"as part of appellee's brief." 
The action taken by the labor commission was not 
correct, as also discussed in Points I and II. Its 
findings on the exercise of discretion are not 
credibly explained. Its conclusion of law on the 
meaning of the statute supports a dubious policy of 
revenue generation. The labor commission knowingly 
and intentionally imposed a penalty contrary to the 
plain language of the statute. The labor commission 
claimed and emphasized punitive and revenue generating 
powers, as illustrated by its Brief Of Industrial 
Accidents Division & Closing Arguments, Points V, VI & 
VII, dated July 26, 1999, p 4, (Addendum 20, R. 34). 
The labor commission's "action was undertaken without 
substantial justification" because it (1) interpreted 
a statute contrary to its plain language when 
challenged, (2) abused its discretion by ignoring 
Anabasis' request to exercise discretion, and (3) was 
motivated by a policy always to generate revenue and 
punish small business by abuse of a statute allowing 
compliance before imposition of a penalty. 
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CONCLUSION 
Section 34A-2-211 is not ambiguous and needs no 
interpretation to carry out the intended purpose of 
the Workers' Compensation Act. The decision of the 
labor commission should be reversed, and not merely 
remanded for more findings. Anabasis should be 
awarded attorney fees and costs. 
DATED: January / , 2 001. 
CARRIE A. CARMICHAEL 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This certifies that the undersigned served the 
foregoing Brief Of Petitioner this / ^ day of 
January 2001, by mailing two copies first class mail 
with sufficient postage prepaid to the following: 
Sheryl M. Hayashi 
Alan Hennebold 
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160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
PO Box 146600 
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LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Joyce A Sewell, Director 
Division of Industrial Accidents 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
PO Box 146610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610 
(801) 530-6800 
(800) 530-5090 
(801) 530-6804 (FAX) 
(801) 530-7685 (TDD) 
LaytonUT 84040 
NOTICE 
NON COMPLIANCE IN PROVIDING WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE COVERAGE 
The Labor Commission of Utah has been notified that your company's workers' compensation 
insurance policy is canceled or you have never had a policy. 
Please provide proof of workers' compensation insurance to the Labor Commission. 
Failure to maintain workers' compensation insurance for your employees could result in a penalty 
being assessed against the company as well as legal action to close your business if you don't 
maintain insurance coverage. 
*If you have coverage in place, please contact your insurance carrier and tell them to send the correct 
information to NCCL 
If you have any questions, contact Carma R Weis at (801) 530-6840 or toll free within Utah 1-800-
530-5090. 
Sincerely, 
Carma R Weis 
Compliance Officer 
*( )I do have workers' compensation insurance (Notify your insurance carrier). 
( )I do not have workers' compensation insurance (Please explain below). 
REMARKS: 
Insurance Carrier: Carrier Phone: . 
Policy Number: Effective Date: 
Print Name: Phone: 
Signed by: Date: 
98-10-85827/crw 
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LABOR COMMISSION 
DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS 
Michael O Leavitt 
Governor 




130 N Fairfield Rd 
THE LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610 
In the Matter of the Noncompliance of: 
Anabasis Inc 
130 N Fairfield Rd 
LaytonUT 84040 
* NOTICE OF NONCOMPLIANCE 
AND INTENT TO ASSESS PENALTY * 
CASE No: 98-10-85827 
The Labor Commission of Utah has received information indicating that you have failed to maintain 
workers' compensation insurance coverage, as required by §34A-2-201, Utah Code Ann., of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. The Labor Commission therefore commences this adjudicatory proceeding 
to determine whether you are liable for the penalties established by §34A-2-21 l(2)(b), Utah Code Ann., of 
the Act. 
Based on the information shown on the attached worksheet, the Labor Commission proposes to 
assess a penalty of $16.87 per week, $2.41 per day or $1,000. whichever is greater for any and all time 
periods of noncompliance from November 02, 1998 to January 12, 1999. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-4, adjudicative proceedings will be conducted informally. 
You may submit any relevant information in writing to the Presiding Officer indicated below within 15 days 
from the date of this Notice. The Presiding Officer will then issue a penalty determination based on the 
information available to the Labor Commission. 
NOTE: In addition to the penalty which may be imposed against you pursuant to this adjudicative 
proceeding, the Labor Commission will also proceed with legal action to close your business if you do not 
provide proof that you have now obtained workers' compensation insurance coverage. 
If you have any questions, contact Carma R Weis at (801) 530-6840 or toll free in Utah at 1-800-
530-5090. 
Date: February 12, 1999, 
H ^ 1 ^ - ^ 1 •#> 
Joytfe A. Sewell 
Presiding Officer 
Addendum page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On February 12. 1999.1 mailed, first class postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
INTENT TO ASSESS PENALTY, with enclosures listed below, to each of the following: 
Anabasis Inc 
130 N Fairfield Rd 
LaytonUT 84040 
IdA* e^e-
Carma R Weis 
Compliance Officer 
Enclosures: 
1. Exhibit A: Penalty worksheet 
2. Exhibit B: Copy of Utah Law 
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LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL (580) C O P Y 
Attorney for Anabasis Inc 
130 North Fairfield 
LaytonUT 84041-3926 
(801) 546-9888 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
PO Box 146610 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6610 
In the Matter of the Noncompliance of ) ANSWER TO NOTICE OF NONCOMPLIANCE 
AND INTENT TO ASSESS PENALTY 
Anabasis Inc ) 
130 N Fairfield Rd 
Layton UT 84041 ) CASE No. 98-10-85827 
Anabasis Inc answers the Notice of Noncompliance and Intent to Assess Penalty 
dated February 12,1999, as follows: 
1. The average weekly wage is $137, not $487 as alleged in the penalty worksheet, 
Exhibit A attached to the notice of noncompliance. 
2. Anabasis Inc has workers' compensation insurance through State Farm Insurance. 
Agent, Bryon Lilijcnquist Insurance Agency, Inc., 1398 North Hillfield Road, Layton, Utah 84041, 
telephone (801) 546-6108. 
3. The alleged default was remedied within 15 days after delivery of the notice as 
allowed by Section 32A-2-211(b), Utah Code Annotated. 
4. The imposition of a penalty is not mandatory under § 34A-2-211(2)(a) which 
provides, in part, "the division may impose a penalty against the employer," Emphasis added. 
5. Pursuant to § 34A-2-211(2)(ii) the division may not impose a penalty because 
Anabasis Inc is conducting business with workers' compensation insurance. Any default has been 
cured with the time allowed by § 32A-2-211 (b). 
6. A $1,000 penalty is confiscatory and unconscionable under the circumstances of 
an average weekly wage of $137. 
WHEREFORE, no penalty determination should be issued. 
DATED: February 16,1999. 
/s/ Larrie A. Carmichael 
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL 
Attorney for Anabasis Inc 
Addendum Page 4a 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This certifies that the undersigned mailed the foregoing Answer To Notice Of 
Noncompliance And Intent To Assess Penalty to the following this 16th day of February 1999. 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
PO Box 146610 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6610 
/s/ Larrie A. Carmichael 
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL 
Attorney for Anabasis Inc 
ANSWER 2 CASE NO. 98-10-85827 
Addendum Page 4b 
LABOR COMMISSION 
DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS 
Michael 0 Leavitt 
Governor 
R Lee Ellertson 
Commissioner 
March 3,1999 
Joyce A Sewell, Director 
Division of Industrial Accidents 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
PO Box 146610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610 
(801) 530-6800 
(800) 530-5090 
(801) 530-6804 (FAX) 
(801) 530-7685 (TDD) 
Larrie A Carmichael 
Attorney for Anabasis Inc 
130 N Fairfield 
LaytonUT 84041 
To Whom it May Concern: 
This Letter comes in response to your letter regarding the penalty for non compliance with 
Utah Law §34A-2-201 requiring an employer to provide workers' compensation insurance for its 
employees. 
In your answer to our Notice of Noncompliance you state the average weekly wage is $137, 
not $487. We are referring to the Utah average weekly wage at 150 % as designated by the Utah 
Legislature. 
You also state that Anabasis is currently covered where in actuality, according to a 
conversation we had with Bryon Liljenquist, your insurance agent, an application had been 
submitted but not accepted at the time you state you were covered. We still have not received proof 
of coverage in the form of a certificate or electronically thru our designee, NCCI. Section 32A-1-
211(b) refers only to the matter of time to respond, not the matter of time to secure workers' 
compensation insurance. 
You state that the imposition of a penalty is not mandatory but it is up to the discretion of 
the Presiding Officer to make that decision. The default has not be "cured" and the law states that 
an employer should have workers' compensation insurance from the time of hire, not fifteen (15 
days after they were found to not have workers' compensation insurance in place. 
The Commission can certainly understand financial difficulties within a business; however, 
non compliance with Utah Law cannot be simply overlooked. Workers' compensation law requiring 
an employer to have insurance is no different from the requirement to have a contractor's license or 
a permit to build. The legislature has determined that failure to provide insurance, just as failure to 
obtain a license or permit, will result in severe penalties. 
Addendum p a g e b 
Based on the above information and the fact there was no insurance in effect during the time 





Addendum page b 
STATE OF UTAH 
LABOR COMMISSION 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610 
In the Matter of the Noncompliance of: * 
* DETERMINATION AND ORDER 
Anabasis Inc * DECLARING NONCOMPLIANCE AND 
130 N Fairfield Rd * ASSESSING A PENALTY 
Layton UT 84 040 * 
CASE No: 98-10-85827 
DETERMINATION 
The Labor Commission of Utah hereby finds that Anabasis Inc failed to 
provide workers' compensation insurance for it employees as required by law from 
November 02, 1998 to January 12, 1999. 
The Highest number of employees working for Anabasis Inc during the period 
of noncompliance was 3, with the highest rated employee class code of 9586 Barber 
Or Beauty Shop. Using the rate and rate multipliers of 0.0077 for November 02, 
1998 to January 12, 1999 for 72 days of noncompliance and 150% of the state's 
average weekly wage, resulting in a penalty assessment of $1,000.00. 
ORDER 
Pursuant to §34A-2-201/ Utah Code Ann., Anabasis Inc is ordered to pay 
$1,000.00 to the Uninsured Employers' Fund as a penalty for noncompliance for the 
time period of: November 02, 1998 to January 12, 19 99. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that should this ORDER go to collection that 
this judgement shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable cost & attorney's 
fees expended in collecting said judgement. 
If you disagree with this DETERMINATION and ORDER, you have THIRTY (30) DAYS 
to appeal pursuant to §34A-2-211(4), Utah Code Ann., or this order becomes final. 
Any appeal shall be made to the Labor Commission and must specify the facts and 
reasons for objecting to the order. 
DATE ORDER ISSUED : 3 7c3 / ?? By: L^ „ <_ , &^ Ay^uL^tf 
/ / /jhycp A. Sewell 
^Director, Industrial Accidents Division 
APPEAL PROCESS IS ON ATTACHED SHEET 
APPEAL PROCESS 
Addendum page 
Pursuant to §34A-2-801, Utah Code Ann., a party aggrieved by this Order may 
appeal by filing a request for a hearing with the Adjudication Division of the 
Labor Commission. Pursuant to §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann., any such request for 
hearing must be received by the Adjudication Division within 30 days from the 
date this Order is signed and must state the grounds on which the appeal is 
based. Appeals should be mailed to the following address: 
Larry Williams 
State Of Utah 
Labor Commission 
P.O. Box 146612 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6612 
The employer's appeal shall specify the facts that are in question and the 
basis of the employer's objection to the determination, imposition, or the amount 
of the penalty. 
Any appeal must be received by the Labor Commission 
within 30 days of the date of issuance in writing. 
If appeals are not received within the 30 day rule 
all appeal rights are forfeited. 
An administrative hearing will be held in accordance with §34A-2-801, Utah 
Code Annotated. 
After a penalty order has been issued and becomes final, the commission may 
file an abstract for any uncollected penalty in district court. The abstract 
shall state the amount of the uncollected penalty, reasonable attorney's fees, 
cost of collection, and court cost. The filed abstract shall have the effect of 
a judgement of that court. §34A-2-211(5), Utah Code Annotated 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Addendum page a 
On _, I mailed, first class postage prepaid, a copy of the 
foregoing DETERMINATION AND ORDER DECLARING NONCOMPLIANCE AND ASSESSING A PENALTY, 
to each of the following: 
Anabasis Inc 
130 N Fairfield Rd 
Layton UT 84040 -
'~6*<L* 
Carma R Weis 
Compliance Officer 
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LARRIEA. CARMICHAEL (580) 
Attorney for Anabasis Inc 
130 North Fairfield 
Layton UT 84041-3926 
(801) 546-9888 
STATE OP UTAH 
LABOR COMMISSION 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
PO Box 146610 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6610 
In the Matter of the Noncompliance ) APPEAL AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 
ON 
of ) DETERMINATION AND ORDER DECLARING 
NONCOMPLIANCE AND ASSESSING A PENALTY 
ANABASIS INC ) 
130 N Fairfield Rd 
Layton UT 84041 ) Case No. 98-10-85827 
APPEAL 
1. Anabasis Inc appeals and requests a hearing before an administrative law judge on 
the Labor Commission's Determination And Order Declaring Noncompliance And Assessing A 
Penalty dated March 3, 1999, copy attached hereto, pursuant to Section 63-46b-12 of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, Section 34A-2-211(4), Utah Code Annotated, and written 
instructions attached to the Determination and Order. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
2. On appeal Anabasis seeks a reasonable exercise of discretion on findings and 
penalty. Anabasis submits that a $1,000.00 penalty is not reasonable nor mandatory in this matter. 
A reasonable exercise of discretion is authorized by § 34A-2-21 l(2)(a), UCA. A reasonable finding 
0* of fact and conclusion of law would be substantial compliance with law on the part of Anabasis. A 
ja reasonable penalty would be no penalty. 
& FACTS 
i^ -j 3. Anabasis Inc is a Utah corporation operating a beauty salon at 130 N Fairfield 
^ Rd., Layton, Utah 84041. Anabasis Inc has been in the beauty salon business continuously for a 
o number of years and has complied with all laws, regulations, rules, ordinances, standards, procedures 
and practices applicable to its business. 
4. The beauty salon is operated b) the two owners of Anabasis Inc, John H. 
Carmichael and Sandie Carmichael, brother and sister. They work as owners and shareholders of 
Anabasis Inc, not as employees. Tax returns are filed as a Subchapter S corporation issuing K-l's 
instead of W-2's to report the owners' draws, income and losses. The owners are not required to be 
covered by workers' compensation insurance. Part-time employees are now covered by workers' 
compensation insurance, and they are issued W-2's. 
5. Anabasis employs some part-time help to wash hair. Other work, such as 
bookkeeping, janitorial and snow removal is done by independent contractors. Anabasis has tenants 
which are not all in the beauty salon business. Tenants are not connected to Anabasis' business, 
except to operate in the same building. 
6. Anabasis relies on its insurance carrier to provide all business insurance coverage. 
Insurance is one of many services Anabasis relies on independent contractors to perform. Anabasis 
had no idea, or reason to know, that there was any gap in insurance coverage until it received a letter 
from the Labor Commission. Counsel does not have a copy of the initial letter from the Labor 
Commission. Upon receipt of the initial letter from the Labor Commission, Anabasis immediately 
contacted its insurance carrier and obtained workers' compensation insurance. Anabasis has 
workers' compensation insurance through State Farm Insurance. Agent, Bryon Lilijenquist 
Insurance Agency, Inc., 1398 North Hillfield Road, Layton, Utah 84041, telephone (801) 546-6108. 
A copy of the workers' Compensation And Employers Liability Policy Information Page is attached 
hereto. 
7. No action, claim or inquiry has ever been made concerning a compensable 
industrial accident or occupational decease with this business. 
(D 




Penalty dated February 12,1999. Counsel does not have a copy of it. 
9. On February 16, 1999, Anabasis served its Answer to the Notice of 
Noncompliance and Intent to Assess Penalty. A copy of the Answer is attached hereto. 
10. By letter dated March 3, 1999, the Labor Commission responded to the Answer to 
APPEAL & REQUEST FOR HEARING 2 CASE NO. 98-10-85827 
the Notice of Noncompliance and Intent to Assess Penalty. This letter rejected the Answer in whole. 
A copy of the letter is attached hereto. 
11. Verification of workers' -compensation coverage was given to the Labor 
Commission before it issued its 3-3-99 Determination And Order. Counsel does not yet have written 
documentation, if any, of such verification, but will offer documentary or other evidence if required. 
12. Labor Commission issued its Determination And Order Declaring Noncompliance 
And Assessing A Penalty dated March 3, 1999. A copy was not mailed to counsel of record. 
GROUNDS AND ARGUMENT 
13. Anabasis repeats and adds to the points made in its 2-12-99 Answer, as follows. 
14. Obviously, the Labor Commission read, but did not consider, the points raised in 
Anabasis' Answer dated February 16, 1999. For example, the following statement set forth in the 
Labor Commission letter dated 3-3-99 is not logical or responsive to paragraph number 1 of 
Anabasis' Answer: "In your answer to our Notice of Noncompliance you state the average weekly 
wage is $137, not $487. We are referring to the Utah average weekly wage at 150% as designated 
by the Utah Legislature." The quoted statement is not correct or informative. A like example, "You 
state that the imposition of a penalty is not mandatory . . . the law states that an employer should 
have workers' compensation insurance from the time of hire, not fifteen (15) days after they were 
found to not have workers' compensation insurance in place." This last example shows the Labor 
Commission read Anabasis' 2-16-99 Answer, but not "the law," which was cited, quoted and 
emphasized in the Answer. Section 32A-2-211(b) does in fact state, "remedy the default within 15 
days after delivery of the notice." Emphasis added. The rest of the Labor Commissions' 3-3-99 
> letter cites "NCCI," whatever that isy and impojrtunes Anabasis to comply with tews. Th& Zxniur 
(D Commission did not exercise discretionary powers mandated by the legislature. 
£ 15. The average weekly wage is $137, not $487 as alleged in the penalty worksheet, 
3 
•*$ Exhibit A attached to the notice of noncompliance. Counsel no longer has a copy of Exhibit A. 
$> 
^ 16. Anabasis has workers' compensation insurance through State Farm Insurance. 
£j Agent, Bryon Lilijenquist Insurance Agency, Inc., 1398 North Hillfield Road, Layton, Utah 84041, 
telephone (801) 546-6108. A copy of the Workers Compensation And Employers Liability Policy 
APPEAL & REQUEST FOR HEARING 3 CASE NO. 98-10-85827 
( A ) 
Information Page is attached hereto. 
& 17. The alleged default was remedied within 15 days after delivery of the notice as 
CD 
S allowed by Section 32A-2-211(b), Utah Code Annotated, by immediate notice to the insurance 
3 carrier. Counsel does not have precise dates, anc submits that precise dates are not decisive in a 
ru discretionary matter. Workers' compensation is mandatory insurance obtainable from only state 
(D 
owned or state regulated carriers; and all being exempt for antitrust and many other laws, have little 
sense of urgency in providing the service which should have been given Anabasis as requested and 
reasonably expected by it. An adverse ruling here could be the basis for a negligence suit against the 
insurance carrier; except the insurance carrier could defend on the grounds that it is not responsible 
for too strict an application of discretionary law by an administrative agency, and claiming it can 
take its own sweet time in dealing with a long established customer. 
18. The imposition of a penalty is not mandatory under § 34A-2-211(2)(a) which 
provides, in part, 'the division may impose a penalty against the employer." Emphasis added. 
19. Pursuant to § 34A-2-211(2)(ii) the division may not impose a penalty because 
Anabasis is conducting business with workers' compensation insurance. Any default has been cured 
U) 
with the time allowed by § 32A-2-211(b), which provides in part, "remedy the default within 15 days 
after delivery of the notice." Emphasis added. 
20. A $1,000 penalty is excessive and unconscionable under the circumstances of an 
average weekly wage of $137. 
CONCLUSION 
On the facts and the law, and by the exercise of reasonable discretion, Anabasis 
should be found in substantial compliance with the workers' compensation law, and no penalty 
should be imposed. Discretionary power includes the power to find substantial compliance to be 
adequate compliance. On review the administrative law judge has the same discretionary power as 
that given to the Labor Commission. 
DATED: March 28,1999. 
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL 
Attorney for Anabasis Inc 
APPEAL & REQUEST FOR HEARING CASE NO. 98-10-85827 
CERTIFICATE CF MAILING 
This certifies that the undersigned mailed the foregoing Request For Hearing On 
Determination And Order Declaring Noncompliance And Assessing A Penalty to the following this 
28th day of March 1999. 
Larry Williams 
State of Utah 
LABOR COMMISSION 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
PO Box 146612 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6612 
ANABASIS INC 






LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL 
Attorney for Anabasis Inc 
APPEAL & REQUEST FOR HEARING 5 CASE NO. 98-10-85827 
Joyce A. Sewell, Director 
Division of Industrial Accidents 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
PO Box 146610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610 
(801) 530-6800 
(800) 530-5090 
(801) 530-6804 (FAX) 
(801) 530-7685 (TDD) 
ANABASIS INC 
130 N FAIRFIELD 
LAYTONUT 84041-3926 
Dear Mr. Carmichael; 
This Letter comes in response to your letter regarding the penalty for non compliance with 
Utah Law §34A-2-201 requiring an employer to provide workers' compensation insurance for its 
employees. 
An investigation was opened for Anabasis Inc. for having employees and no workers' 
compensation insurance. The section §34A-2-211 la & lb deals with an employer who does not 
have workers' compensation insurance. If they do not have coverage with fifteen (15) days the 
commission can get a District Judge to issue a restraining order to shut the business down until 
coverage is obtained. However, section §34A-2-211 2a-d specifies the penalty that may be imposed. 
The Statue §34A-2-201 determines how the calculations for the penalties are done. We can also go 
back three (3) years on a penalty and we use the higher of the actual penalty or $1,000. 
A company has employees full-time, part-time or any-time they must have workers' 
compensation insurance. It is up to the employer, not the insurance carrier, to make sure they have 
workers' compensation insurance. Workers' compensation insurance can be purchased from 218 
carriers that are licensed by the Utah Insurance Commission to write workers' comp. Anabasis Inc 
dba John's Salon has been in business since 1994 without workers' compensation insurance. Job 
Service has shown six (6) employees during that time. The penalty will remain at $1,000.00. 
The Commission can certainly understand financial difficulties within a business; however, 
non compliance with Utah Law cannot be simply overlooked. Workers' compensation law requiring 
an employer to have insurance is no different from the requirement to have a contractor's license or 
a permit to build. The legislature has determined that failure to provide insurance, just as failure to 
obtain a license or permit, will result in severe penalties. 
Addendum p a g e lb 
LABOR COMMISSION 
DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Commissioner 
March 30,1999 
LARRIE A CARMICHAEL (580) 
130 N FAIRFIELD 
LAYTON UT 84041-3926 
Based on the above information and the fact there was no insurance in effect during the time 
period penalized for by the commission the penalty will not be waived. Your appeal of the penalty 
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SHERYL M. HAYASHI (6397) 
Attorney for Industrial Accidents Division 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
LABOR COMMISSION - STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter of the Noncompliance of: * BRIEF OF 
* INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS 
ANABASIS INC * DIVISION 
130 N. Fairfield Road * & CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
Layton, UT 84041 * 
* Judge: Don George 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent contends the Division cannot impose a penalty pursuant to §34A-2-211(2)(B) 
while the employer is conducting business with worker's compensation insurance. 
Respondent contends the Division's authority to impose a penalty ceases upon an 
employer securing worker's compensation insurance for its employees. This assertion is clearly 
not within the meaning or intent of the Workers Compensation Act when read as a whole. 
Respondent's argument that employers are somehow absolved of liability for a penalty for a 
lapse in workers compensation coverage simply by securing coverage is completely without 
merit. 
Respondent asserts the plain meaning of the statute is that the penalty provision only 
applies when the "employer is conducting business without securing worker's compensation 
coverage." [Respondent's Hearing Brief]. However, Respondent fails to mention that the 
penalty language of Section 34A-2-21 l(2)(a)(ii) is directly tied to the statutory language 
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BRIEF OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS DIVISION 
PAGE 2 
imposing upon employers a clear cut responsibility to maintain continuous and ongoing coverage 
of workers compensation insurance. In looking at the section cited by Respondent, Section 34A-
2-211 (2) states in relevant part, 
Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division may impose a penalty against the 
employer under this Subsection (2)* 
(o . . . 
(ii) If the division believes that an employer of one or more employees 
is conducting business without securing the payment of benefits in 
one of the three ways provided Section 34A-2-201. 
In this particular case, Section 34A-2-201(l)(b), requires that employers shall secure the 
payment of workers' compensation benefits for their employees "by insuring and keeping 
insured, the payment of compensation with any stock corporation or mutual association 
authorized to transact the business of workers' compensation in this state..." [emphasis added] 
The statute does not merely require that employers currently insure payment of compensation, 
but that such insurance must be continuous and ongoing, hence the language "keeping insured." 
When Section 34A-2-211(2) is read in conjunction with 34A-2-201, the language clearly 
states the division may impose a penalty against the employer if the division believes that an 
employer of one or more employees is conducting business without securing the payment of 
benefits by . . . insuring, and "keeping" insured, workers compensation benefits for their 
employees. An employer's failure to "keep" its business insured is a violation for which the 
Division may impose a penalty, without regard to whether the employer is currently insured. 
At most, the language is ambiguous. When interpreting an ambiguous statute, we first try 
to discover the underlying intent of the legislature, guided by the purpose of the statute as a 
Addendum page id 
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whole and the legislative history. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co ofUtah. 353 ?.2d 877, 830 (Utah 
1993). The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect of the intent of the legislature 
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Sullivan. 853 P.2d 877 at 880, Nixon v. 
Salt Lake Citv Corp. 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995)., 
In clarifying any ambiguous statutory language, it is appropriate to look at language 
within the same section for guidance. A statute should be construed as a whole, with all of its 
provisions construed to be harmonious with each other and with the overall legislative objective 
of the statute. Utah State Road Commn'n v. Friberg. 687 P.2d 821, 831 (Utah 1984). The 
language of the accompanying penalty provisions within Section 34A-2-211 clearly refer in past 
tense to periods of lapse in coverage. Section 34-A-2-211(b) speaks in terms of imposing a 
penalty "three times the amount of the premium the employer should have paid for workers 
compensation insurance based on the rate filing of the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
during the period of noncompliance." [emphasis added]. In addition, Section 34A-2-211(d) 
refers to "The payroll basis for the purpose of calculating the premium penalty shall be 150% of 
the state's average weekly wage multiplied by the highest number of workers employed by the 
employer during the period of the employer's noncompliance multiplied by the number of 
weeks of the employers noncompliance up to a maximum of 156 weeks during the period of 
the employer's noncompliance." [emphasis added]. The fact that these provisions refer to 
periods of noncompliance indicate that the intent of the statute is to impose a structure for 
penalizing employers who do not maintain continuous workers compensation coverage for its 
employees. 
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Further evidence of the intent of the statute lies in the designation of where foiids 
received from penalty matters are to be deposited. Penalties received foriapsesin coverage are 
deposited in the Uninsured Employer's Fund (hereinafter "UEF"). The purpose* of UEF is to 
create a fund for the purpose of compensating employees for work-related accidents that may 
occur when an employer is uninsured and cannot otherwise compensate the injured person. 
U.C.A. §34A-2-211(3)(1997). Such penalties in fact keep UEF viable and are directly tied to the 
reason for which UEF is created-to compensate employees for work-related injuries on behalf 
of employers who have failed to to maintain workers compensation coverage. 
Employer and UEF liability may attach for up to six years according to the Act. See, 
U.C.A. §34A-2-417(2)(1997). Potentially, an employee may file a claim for workers 
compensation coverage for an injury that occurred during a lapse in coverage six years after the 
date of injury. The intent of the statute clearly shows UEF is created to compensate injured 
workers from insolvent employers who are uninsured; and that in order to keep the fund viable, 
employers who do not maintain workers compensation coverage, are punished in the form of a 
monetary fine in order to keep the fund viable. To hold in favor of respondent's contention 
would mean UEF may be liable for paying for industrial accidents without any source of income. 
As such, it is clear the legislature intended the penalty to accommodate and compensate the fund 
for liability for paying out compensation for uninsured employers for those periods of 
noncompliance, regardless of whether or not an employer is currently insured. 
The very nature of a penalty is to punish. The penalty provisions do not exist merely to 
serve as an incentive for employers to gain coverage and therefore absolve themselves of paying 
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a penalty. The Workers Compensation Act clearly requires continuous coverage of workers 
compensation coverage. To hold otherwise, would render the penalty provisions virtually useless. 
An employer could maintain long lapses in coverage until such time as the Division sought to 
penalize, and then simply secure coverage and escape any type of penalty. Virtually an employer 
can continue operating the business without any reason to comply with the law until they are 
caught by the Labor Commission. The employer could then secure coverage, be free from a 
penalty, and yet expose the Uninsured Employer's Fund to liability for the lapse in coverage. 
The very fact that the legislature set forth a penalty provision in the statute and a calculation for 
determining such penalties based upon periods of noncompliance, evidences the legislature's 
intent to punish employers for periods of noncompliance. 
This provision must be interpreted in context of the intent of the section as well as in 
context of reading of the statute as a whole. Respondent's contention that the Division's ability 
to impose a penalty ceases when an employer obtains coverage is without merit. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
The issue in this matter is clear. Respondent was an active Utah employer, maintained 
employees, and failed to provide workers compensation benefits for those employees. A penalty 
of $1000.00 was imposed for this period of noncompliance. 
Respondent stipulated to the fact that they did not have workers compensation coverage 
for the period in issue: November 2,1998 to January 12,1999. Further, Respondent stipulated to 
the fact that they had employees during this period of time. Based upon a calculation of the 
penalty pursuant to 34A-2-21 l(2)(b), Respondent is liable for a penalty of $1,000.00. 
Addendum page 21 
BRIEF OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS DIVISION 
PAGE 6 
Respondent asserts the Division has no authority to impose a penalty because the 
statutory language indicates that such power is discretionary. The Division has exercised its 
discretion simply by its act of imposing a penalty in this matter, despite Respondent's argument 
that language within the order does not indicate any exercise of discretion. Although the 
Division vehemently disagrees with Respondent's arguments in this regard, the fact that the 
Division chose to penalize for the time period November 2,1998 to January 12, 1999 instead of 
the time period Respondents admits they were without coverage, April 1, 1994 to February 12, 
1999, is also an exercise of discretion. 
Further, the Division asserts the intent and purpose of Section 34A-2-211 permits the 
Division to impose penalties for periods of noncompliance, and that the Division's authority does 
not cease merely upon an employer securing coverage. The Division asserts that because the 
language of Section 34A-2-21 l(2)(a)(ii) refers specifically to Section 34A-2-201, imposing a 
mandatory obligation for an employer to maintain continuous coverage, that provisions within 
the same section refer to imposition of a penalty for "periods of noncompliance", and that the 
overall purpose of the penalty provisions is to penalize or punish an employer for 
noncompliance, not serve merely as an incentive, clearly demonstrates the intent and purpose of 
the penalty provisions to serve as a mechanism for punishment for periods of noncompliance. As 
such, the Division's ability to impose a penalty does not cease simply because an employer 
secures workers compensation coverage. The Workers Compensation Act must be read as a 
whole. 
Respectfully, the Division requests that the Administrative Law Judge uphold the 
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imposition of a $1000.00 penalty in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ day of July, 1999. 
SHERYtM. H A / A S H I 
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STATE OF UTAH 
LABOR COMMISSION 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
PO Box 146610 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6610 
In the Matter of the Noncompliance ) 
REPLY BRIEF OF ANABASIS 
of ) 
ANABASIS INC ) Hon. Don George 
130 N Fairfield Rd 
Layton UT 84041 ) Case No. 98-10-85827 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Labor Commission claims it may impose a penalty pursuant to Section 34A-2-
211(2), Utah Code Annotated, notwithstanding plain language to the contrary set forth in this 
section. The Labor Commission does not, and can not, dispute the plain language of this section 
prohibits a penalty if the employer has insurance at the time the penalty is imposed. Nevertheless, 
the Labor Commission claims: The penalty is allowed if the Workers Compensation Act is read as a 
whole (Br. p 1.), and "At most, the statutory language is ambiguous." (Br. p 2.) Anabasis replies by 
discussing the following points gleaned and marshaled from the Labor Commission's brief: 
1. Does the meaning or intend of the Workers Compensation Act when read as 
whole allow the Division to impose a penalty when the employer is insured? 
2. Is the statutory language ambiguous, therefore requiring statutory interpretation? 
3. Do the penalty provisions of § 34a-2-211 indicate an intent to penalize past lapses 
in insurance coverage cured at the time the penalty is imposed? 
4. What is the purpose of the statute? 
5. Do penalty deposits to the Uninsured Employer's Fund have anything to do with 
statutory interpretation? 
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6. Is the § 34A-2-211 penalty punitive or remedial or both? 
7. Are the penalty provisions of $ 24A-2-211 rendered virtually useless by its plain 
language? 
8. Did the Division exercise discretion in imposing the penalty? 
FACTS 
1. The effective date of insurance is 2-1-99. 
2. The date of Notice of Noncompliance and Intent to Assess Penalty is 2-12-99. 
3. The date of Anabasis Inc 's Answer to Notice of Noncompliance and Intent to 
Assess Penalty is 2-16-99, and in which the division was again notified of insurance coverage. 
4. The date of the Determination imposing a penalty is 3-3-99. 
LAW 
"(2)(a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division may impose a penalty . . . (ii) if 
the division believes that an employer of one or more employees | s conducting business without 
[workers' compensation insurance], (b) The penalty imposed . . . shall be the greater of: (i) $1,000;" 
etc. Emphasis added. Section 34A-2-211(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DOES THE MEANING OR INTEND O F THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT W H E N 
READ AS AS WHOLE ALLOW T H E DIVISION TO IMPOSE A PENALTY WHEN THE 
EMPLOYER IS INSURED? 
The Labor Commission claims the plain text of § 34A-2-211(2) "is clearly not within 
the meaning or intent of the Workers Compensation Act when read as a whole." (Br. p i . ) Reading 
the Act as a whole we find corroboration for Anabasis ' position in the following: 
34A-2-211. Notice of noncompliance to employer — Enforcement power of division — 
Penalty. - > 
(1) (a) In addition to the remedies specified in Section 34A-2-210, if the division has JL 
reason to believe that an employer is conducting business without securing the payment g 
of benefits in one of the three ways provided in Section 34A-2-201, the division may give p^ 
that employer written notice of the noncompliance by certified mail to the last-known g 
address of the employer. 3 
(b) If the employer does not remedy the default within 15 days after delivery of the *U 
notice, the division may issue an order requiring the employer to appear before the J2j 
division and show cause why the employer should not be ordered to comply with Section (D 
34A-2-201. ^ 
(c) If it is found that the employer has failed to provide for the payment of benefits in one \r\ 
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of the three ways provided in Section 34A-2-201, the division may require any 
JP, employer to comply with Section 34A-2-201. (Emphasis added.) 
p. 
&* Anabasis submits that the above language indicates the moaning and intent of the Act, 
P? read as a whole, includes remedial action without imposing a penalty The remedial action can be 
Q 
had any time before the penalty is imposed. Not imposing a penalty during the two-week notice 
KQ period is consistent with the plain language of not imposing a penalty if the employer is insured. 
eo Please note the emphasized part of the above statutory language allowing the employer to remedy 
the default. Notice to remedy a default is an express statement that the default can be remedied. 
Therefore, reading the Act as a whole, express corroboration is found in § 34A-2-211(l)(b) ("remedy 
the default") for the specific language in § 34A-2-211(2)(a)(ii) ("is conducting business without") 
insurance. Also please note, that the penalty may be imposed only if the business "is conducting 
business" without insurance, even if the default is cured after the two-week notice period expires. 
The language clearly implies no penalty will be imposed during the two-week period, but there still 
must be continuing noncompliance if the penalty is imposed after the two-week period. The above 
statement of facts sets forth dates showing compliance within the two-week period. 
POINT II 
IS THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AMBIGUOUS, THEREFORE REQUIRING STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION? 
The Labor Commission claims, "At most, the statutory language is ambiguous. When 
interpreting an ambiguous statute" etc. The Labor Commission proceeds with its interpretation 
without explaining what ambiguity exits. (Br. p 2.) The Labor Commission does not quote what 
"statutory language is ambiguous." We do not know which section or what language of the code is 
claimed to be ambiguous. The Labor Commission does not state why the statutory language is 
claimed to be ambiguous. The Labor Commission merely proceeds to discuss why the statute should 
be interpreted to its liking, without first pointing out what language is ambiguous. The Labor ^ 
& 
Commission cites cases on how to interpret legislation, but it cites no cases explaining why this <i> 
a 
statute should be interpreted in the first place. Read alone, § 34A-2-211(2) is not ambiguous. g 
)j 
Reading the whole Workers Compensation Act, § 34A-2-211(2) still is not ambiguous. The act is <j 
not ambiguous in whole or in part. There is nothing ambiguous about requiring continuous (U 
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insurance and imposing a penalty if a default "in coverage is not cured after notice or before 
imposition of a penalty. Counsel can find no argument :R the-Labor Commission's brief pointing to 
ambiguities, inconsistencies or contradictions in the act. just arguments supporting its interpretation 
of the act as written. The Labor Commission wants § 34A.-2-211 amended from "is conducting 
business" to read "was conducting business." The Labor Commission may have its reasons for 
wanting the change, but ambiguity is not a valid reason. 
POINT III 
DO THE PENALTY PROVISIONS OF § 34A-2-211 INDICATE AN INTENT TO PENALIZE 
PAST LAPSES IN INSURANCE COVERAGE CURED AT THE TIME THE PENALTY IS 
IMPOSED? 
The Labor Commission claims, "The language of the accompanying penalty 
provisions within Section 34A-2-211 clearly refer in past tense to periods of lapse in coverage." (Br. 
p3.) The past-tense quotations in the Labor Commission's brief refer only to how to compute the 
penalty, if imposed, not to the authority to impose the penalty. It is not ambiguous to impose no 
penalty for a remedied violation and impose a penalty for an un-remedied violation computed by the 
amount of time the violation took place. 
Section 34A-2-201 requiring continuous insurance does not change the plain meaning 
of § 34a-2-211 allowing a penalty if the employer is not insured. The Labor Commission cites no 
valid authority for its claim that § 34-2-211 can be interpreted to mean something other than what it 
says. Reading the whole Workers Compensation Act does not change the clear meaning of § 34A-2-
211(2). The Labor Commission cites § 34A-2-201(l)(b) requiring an employer to continuously 
maintain insurance, and claims that the combined sections 201 and 211 authorize the penalty. 
However, the Labor Commission does not explain how the combined reading does away with jp 
section 201's requirement "that an employer of one or more employees is conducting business Pi 
<D 
without [workers' compensation insurance]." If there is a penalty for failure to continuously P 
maintain insurance, § 34A-2-211 is not it. 3 
POINT IV P» 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE? *§ 
The stated purpose of the statute is: M 
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CL "Employers to secure workers' compensation benefits for emplojees . . . (1) Employers . 
© .. shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits Tor tlieir employees: . . . 
p, (b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment 6f this compensation . . . " 
g § 34A-2-201(l). 
*~cJ Section 34A-2-211(2) carries out this purpose'without ambiguity or conflict with 
Q other provisions by providing: 
to (2)(a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division may impose a penalty . . . (ii) if the 
division believes that an employer of one or more employees |s conducting business 
without [workers' compensation insurance]. Emphasis added. 
POINT V 
DO PENALTY DEPOSITS TO THE UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S FUND HAVE ANYTHING 
TO DO WITH STATUTORY INTERPRETATION? 
The economic argument about where the penalty money is deposited is irrelevant. 
(Br. p 4.) It may be nice to know that the Labor Commission is not dependent on penalties for its 
funding, budgeting and appropriations, but that has nothing to do with statutory interpretation. The 
pittance generated from fining hapless small businesses hardly would enhance the financial stability 
of the Uninsured Employer's Fund. The threat of the penalty might have a salutary effect on 
compliance by small businesses. The Labor Commission seems to argue the purpose of the law is 
revenue generation instead of compliance. The clear wording of § 34A-2-211(2)(a) would 
accomplish purposes of revenue generation and compliance. There is no reason to suspect obtaining 
compliance at the expense of revenue generation is contrary to legislative purpose. 
POINT VI 
IS THE § 34A-2-211 PENALTY PUNITIVE OR REMEDIAL OR BOTH? 
The Labor Commission emphasis the punitive and revenue generating aspects of § 
34A-2-211 in its brief. Section 34A-2-211(2) is both remedial and punitive. The statute is hard on 
employers who do not remedy violations, and lenient for those who do remedy violations. There is 
nothing ambiguous or inconsistent with this. The legislature makes policy, the Labor Commission ^ 
carries it out. The legislative policy is clearly remedial, as well as punitive and revenue generating. [? 
P. 
POINT VII g 
ARE THE PENALTY PROVISIONS OF § 34A-2-211 RENDERED VIRTUALLY USELESS BY p 
ITS PLAIN LANGUAGE? 'g 
"The penalty provisions do not exist merely to serve as an incentive for employers to (!) 
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gain coverage and therefore absolve themselves-of ravins *a canaltv." (Br. p 4.) The penalty 
provision is a useful tool for generating compliance and needs no additional purpose to justify its 
existence. Revenue generating and penal statutes are ncSt the-6nly statutes that are useful. The Labor 
Commission may consider "the penalty provisions virtuaUy ureless" (Br. p 5.) to itself because they 
do not produce what it considers enough revenue, but that does not make them useless. 
The Labor Commission claims, 'The very nature of a penalty is to punish." (Br. p 4.) 
It is also the nature of a penalty to deter and remedy. Section 34A-2-21 l(2)(a) deters, remedies, and 
punishes those who are not deterred and who do not remedy violations. There is nothing ambiguous 
about this useful law. The Labor Commission claims employers can ignore the law with impunity 
until caught by merely obtaining insurance under the plain language of § 34A-2-21 l(2)(a). (Br. p 5.) 
That is not true. The Workers Compensation Act is ignored at great risk and peril. 
POINT VIII 
DID THE DIVISION EXERCISE DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY? 
At the hearing the administrative law judge stated there appears to be some evidence 
that the Labor Commission exercised discretion in deciding to impose a penalty. That finding should 
be reconsidered in light of the Labor Commission's assertion to the contrary in its brief. "The 
Division has exercised its discretion simply by its act of imposing a penalty in this matter . . . 
Although the Division vehemently disagrees with Respondent's arguments in this regard, the fact 
that the Division chose to penalize for [a specific time period] is also an exercise of discretion." (Br. 
p 6.) That is not an exercise of administrative discretion. That is a "vehement" statement of policy 
not to exercise discretion. The Labor Commission's "vehement" statement of policy reasonably 
leads counsel to assume it has never exercised, and will never exercise, its discretion to not penalize, 
or to reduce the penalty, in appropriate circumstances calling for the sound exercise of administrative 
discretion as required by the statute. Anabasis submits that a finding the Labor Commission 
exercised its discretion cannot be reasonably made in light of the Labor Commission's "vehement" 
statement of policy to the contrary. 
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On appeal Anabasis seeks a reasonable exercise of discretion on findings and penalty. 
Anabasis submits that a $1,000.00 penalty is net rea?on?ble nor mandatory in this matter. A 
reasonable exercise of discretion is authorized by § 34A-2-211(2)(a). A reasonable finding of fact 
and conclusion of law would be substantial compliauce with law on the part of Anabasis. A 
reasonable penalty would be no penalty. 
CONCLUSION 
The Labor Commission correctly observes, 'The Workers Compensation Act must be 
read as a whole." (Br. p 6.) Read in whole, in part, and in plain English, Anabasis is in compliance 
and the Labor Commission is not. 
The Section 34A-2-211(2)(a) penalty is an additional penalty which may be imposed 
only when the employer is in violation at the time the penalty is imposed, "notwithstanding" other 
penalties which may be imposed and other remedies which may be pursued. The $1,000 penalty 
cannot be imposed on Anabasis Inc because it was in compliance when the penalty was imposed. 
DATED: August 13,1999. 
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL 
Attorney for Anabasis Inc 
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Utah Labor Commission 
Adjudication Division 
Case No. 1981085827 
IN THE MATTER OF NONCOMPLIANCE: 
ANABASIS INC 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: July 7,1999 at 10 a.m. 
Labor Commission of Utah 
Hearing Room 336 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
BEFORE: Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
APPEARANCES: Anabasis,Inc. (Anabasis or petitioner) is represented by attorney 
Larrie Carmichael. 
The Industrial Accidents Division (the Division) of the Labor 
Commission is represented by attorney Sheryl Hayashi. 
At the hearing, no testimony was taken, and only documentary evidence was 
received. Having reviewed the file, the evidence and written arguments, the ALJ finds 
and concludes as follows: 
Anabasis, Inc. is a Utah corporation operating a beauty salon at 1300 North 
Fairfield Road, Layton, Utah. It is undisputed that Anabasis had employees during the 
period in question from November 2, 1998 through January 12,1999, but did not have 
workers compensation insurance in force during that period. It is also undisputed that 
Anabasis did not have during that period nor has it ever had a compensable industrial 
accident or occupational disease claim during its operation. 
Anabasis obtained workers comp insurance coverage, effective February 1, 
1999. 
Subsequently, on February 12,1999 the Industrial Accidents Division issued a 
Notice of Noncompliance and Intent to Assess Penalty. Anabasis timely answered that 
notice on February 16, 1999. On March 3, 1999, the Division issued a Determination 
and Order Declaring Noncompliance and Assessing a Penalty (in the statutory 
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minimum alternative amount of $1,000), which Determination and Order was 
appealable within the succeeding 30 days. 
Anabasis timely filed an appeal and argues on the following grounds: 
1. U.C.A. Section 32A-2-211 (b) should be interpreted so that obtaining 
workers compensation coverage within 15 days of the Notice of Noncompliance and 
Intent to Assess Penalty (or as here, before the 15 day period even begins), is a bar to 
the imposition of any penalty under Section 34A-2-211 (2)(b). 
2. asking for a reasonable exercise of discretion on findings (such as 
substantial compliance with the law on the part of Anabasis) and no penalty (Anabasis 
deeming a $1000 penalty as excessive and unconscionable in this matter). 
The applicable statutory sections are: 
34A-2-211. Notice of noncompliance to employer -
Enforcement power of division -Penalty. 
(1) (a) In addition to the remedies specified in Section 
34A-2-210, if the division has reason to believe that an 
employer is conducting business without securing the 
payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in 
Section 34A-2-201, the division may give that employer 
written notice of the noncompliance by certified mail to the 
last-known address of the employer. 
(b) If the employer does not remedy the default within 
15 days after delivery of the notice, the division may issue 
an order requiring the employer to appear before the division 
and show cause why the employer should not be ordered to 
comply with Section 34A-2-201. 
(c) If it is found that the employer has failed to provide 
for the payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided 
in Section 34A-3-201, the division may require any employer 
to comply with Section 34A-2-201. 
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(2) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division 
may impose a penalty against the employer under this 
Subsection (2): 
(i) subject to the notice and other requirements of 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act; and 
(ii) if the division believes that an employer of one or 
more employees is conducting business without securing the 
payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in 
Section 34A-2-201. 
(b) The penalty imposed under Subsection (2)(a) shall 
be the greater of: 
(i) $1,000; or 
(ii) three times the amount of the premium the 
employer would have paid for workers' compensation 
insurance based on the rate riling of the Workers1 
Compensation Fund of Utah during the period of 
noncompliance. 
When subsections (1) (a) through (c) are read in sequence, it is clear that if the 
Industrial Accidents Division has a reasonable belief that an employer is uninsured, it 
may require by certified mail notice that the employer prove within 15 days that it has 
workers compensation coverage, or if the employer fails to show cause why coverage is 
unnecessary, an order requiring compliance [i.e., requiring the employer to obtain 
insurance] will issue. Such an order can be a prelude to a civil action against the 
employer under Section 34A-2-210, or criminal actions under Section 34A-2-209 or 
Section 34A-2-802. If, as in this case, the employer responds with timely proof that it 
has coverage, no order would issue. To that extent, Anabasis is correct that it was not 
in violation from February 1,1999 on, and therefore no further order could issue 
requiring it to obtain insurance. 
Arriving at that conclusion does not preclude application of 34A-2-211(2) as 
Subsection (b) thereof clearly states that the Division may impose a penalty 
notwithstanding Subsection (1)» in an amount three times the premium during the 
period of noncompliance (emphasis added). It follows logically that if the opening 
statement in Section 2 (a) disallows section 1, it does so in its entirety, not piecemeal. 
Therefore, discussion of the 15 day period in Section 1 is irrelevant, as is Anabasis' 
focus on the date of compliance. The penalty is imposed for the period when Anabasis 
had employees but did not have coverage. That period is not disputed as being from 
November 2, 1998 through January 12,1999. 
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Anabasis second contention is that the Division has not exercised discretion 
because it chose to impose a penalty (as the statute allows), and because the penalty 
was for $1,000. The choice to impose a penalty or not, is in fact a discretionary act. 
The amount of the penalty is not a discretionary act as it is mandated by Section 
34A-2-211 (2) (b) to be the greater of $1,000 or three times the premium for the period 
of noncompliance. The Division followed that statutory mandate and properly imposed 
the $1,000 penalty. Anabasis has not provided any case law that would allow the 
Division, the Administrative Law Judge, or the Labor Commission to impose, reduce, or 
suspend that $1,000 penalty. Accordingly, the penalty should be affirmed. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Industrial Accidents Division's March 3, 
1999 Determination and Order Declaring Noncompliance and Assessing a Penalty, 
dated, against Anabasis, Inc., is hereby affirmed in its entirety. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by this decision may file a Motion for Review with the 
Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set 
forth the specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 
days from the date the decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their 
Responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for 
Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission 
conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for 
Review or its Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the 
Appeals Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
DATED this 14th day of April, 2000. 
UTAH1-ABOR COMMISSION 
Donald L. George 
Administrative Law Judge 
^ e . 
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STATE OF UTAH 
LABOR COMMISSION 
DIVISION OF ADJUDICATION 
APPEALS BOARD 
160 East 300 South, 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615 
In the Matter of Noncompliance ) MOTION FOR REVIEW 
of ) 
Case No. 98-10-85827 
ANABASIS INC ) 
Anabasis Inc appeals and moves review of the decision of the administrative law 
judge, Donald L. George, set forth in the Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, and Order dated 
April 14,2000. 
Anabasis requests the appeal be heard by the Appeals Board. 
This appeal is made pursuant to Sections 34A-1-303, 63-46b-12, Utah Code 
Annotated, and Rule R602-2-1 M of the Utah Administrative Code. 
Anabasis was substantially prejudiced by the following errors: 
1. The administrative law judge did not properly interpret and apply the law. The 
applicable law, cited by the administrative law judge, is "Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the 
division may impose a penalty . . . (ii) if the division believes that an employer or one or more 
employees is conducting business without securing [workers' compensation insurance], (b) The 
penalty imposed . . . shall be the greater of: (i) $1,000;" etc. Emphasis added. § 34A-2-211(2). 
2. The administrative law judge did not make a finding of fact or conclusion of law 
that the Division exercised discretion in imposing the $1,000 penalty. Other findings of fact are not 
disputed. The administrative law judge decided all of the issues requiring resolution, but the penalty 
part of the order is not supported by findings. 
The grounds for review are: 
1. The Administrative law judge incorrectly interpreted the statute's plain language, 
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and has no authority to interpret the statute. The administrative law judge erred in corchdin^ ?s a 
matter of law that the Division may impose a penalty when the employer is in compliance if the 
employer was not in past compliance. The error is ignoring the words "is con|ductink business 
without securing" workers compensation. The language of the statute does not alloto*imposition of a 
penalty for a past period of noncompliance of an employer in compliance at the time the penalty is 
imposed. To do so is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. The plain wording of the 
statute is not ambiguous. Therefore, interpreting the statute is not proper. The division has no 
express or implied authority to interpret unambiguous statutory language. Reading the statute as a 
whole does not make the statutory language ambiguous. There is only one reasonable and 
permissible reading of the words "is conducting business." The administrative law judge is correct 
in stating "discussion of the 15 day period in Section 1 [§ 34A-2-211(1)] is irrelevant," but is in error 
in saying "as is Anabasis' focus on the date of compliance." The words "is conducting business" 
also appear in § 34A-2-211(2)(a)(ii), and is the actual focus of Anabasis' argument. 
2. The administrative law judge erred in not making a finding of fact or conclusion 
of law that the Division exercised discretion. The findings of fact and conclusions of law are not 
adequate to support the penalty part of the order. The conclusion that 'The choice to impose a 
penalty or not, is in fact a discretionary act" is an interpretation of the statute. It is not a finding of 
fact that the Division did an act amounting to such exercise, nor is it a conclusion of law that 
discretion was exercised by such act. A finding of fact or conclusion of law that the Division 
properly exercised discretion cannot be made because the Division never has and never will exercise 
discretion, its policy being stated in its Brief dated July 26, 1999: 'The Division has exercised its 
discretion simply by its act of imposing a penalty in this matter . . . Although the Division 
0* vehemently disagrees with Respondent's arguments in this regard, the fact that the Division chose to 
(D 
2 penalize for [a specific time period] is also an exercise of discretion." (Br. p. 6.) Always imposing 
D the maximum penalty all the time is an exercise of policy not an exercise of discretion, and is 
r> contrary to law. The division may not refuse to exercise discretion under the statute. There are 
facts in the record justifying an exercise of discretion. Anabasis reasonably believed it had 
en 
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g, purchased full business insurance coverage and was unaware of this gap in coverage until notified by 
& 
»3 the division. The administrative law judge found that no workers compensation claim has'ever been 
5 made against Anabasis. The Labor Commission makes the dubious argument that the purpose of the 
^ law is to generate revenue in its Brief dated July 26, 1999, page 4 Any claim the Qivision ever 
\Q * • * • 
® exercises discretion should be viewed with enormous skepticism. The administrative law judge is in 
U) 
^o error in stating "Anabasis has not provided any case law that would allow the Division, the 
Administrative Law Judge, or the Labor Commission to impose, reduce, or suspend that $1,000 
penalty." Anabasis did not cite case law because it cited statutory law, specifically "the division may 
impose a penalty" at § 34A-2-211(2)(a). Case law is not necessary to understand the word "may" 
means discretionary. 
DATED: May 5,2000. 
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL 
Attorney for Anabasis Inc 
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In the matter of: * 
noncompliance of * ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
ANABASIS INC, 
* Case No. 1981085827 
* 
* 
Anabasis Inc. asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review the 
Administrative Law Judge's assessment of penalty against Anabasis pursuant to §34A-2-211(2) 
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah* 
Code Ann. §§63-46b-12, 34A-2-211(4)(c), and 34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND 
Section 34A-2-201 of the Act requires Utah employers to maintain workers' compensation 
coverage. Under §34A-2-211(2) of the Act, the Commission's Industrial Accidents Division may 
penalize employers doing business without such coverage. Pursuant to these provisions of the 
Act, the Division assessed a penalty of $1,000 against Anabasis for the period of its 
noncompliance. Anabasis appealed the penalty to the Commission's Adjudication Division, which 
affirmed the penalty. Anabasis then sought Appeals Board review of the ALJ's decision. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Anabasis contends it is not subject to penalty under §34A-2-211(2) because it obtained 
coverage before the penalty was actually imposed. Anabasis also contends the ALJ's decision 
lacks adequate findings to support imposition of the penalty. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The parties submitted this matter for decision based on the documentary evidence 
contained in the file The documentary evidence establishes that Anabasis, a corporation, does 
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business under the name of "John's Salon." The salon has been in business for several years1 and 
has had employees during that time. 
During October 1998 the Division received information that Anabasis had no workers' 
compensation coverage. After investigation, the Division concluded the allegation was correct. 
On February 12, 1999, the Division notified Anabasis that it intended to assess a noncompliance 
penalty of $1,000, the minimum penalty provided in §34A-2-411(2), against Anabasis for its 
failure to maintain coverage for the period of November 2, 1998, to January 12, 1999. Anabasis 
then obtained a policy of workers' compensation insurance with coverage backdated to February 
1, 1999. On March 3, 1999, the Division imposed the $1,000 noncompliance penalty against 
Anabasis.2 
Although Anabasis has been an employer for six years, it has never previously obtained 
workers' compensation coverage Anabasis's employees have not incurred any work- related 
injuries 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-201 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act imposes the following 
obligation on Utah employers (emphasis added): 
An employer shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for its 
employees by. 
(1) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah; 
(2) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with any 
stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of 
workers' compensation insurance in this state; or 
(3) obtaining approval from the division in accordance with Section 34A-2-201.5 
to pay direct compensation . . . . 
1
 Department of Workforce Services records indicate the salon became active as a Utah 
employer in 1994 and has employed from two to six employees each calendar quarter since then. 
2
 The Division chose to commence the penalty period on November 2, 1998, even though 
Anabasis had failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance for several years prior to that 
date Had Anabasis purchased insurance for all prior years at even the minimum available 
premium, its cost would have exceeded $1,800. 
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Those employers who violate §34A-2-201 by failing to maintain workers' compensation 
coverage are subject to the penalty authorized by §34A-2-211(2) of the Act: 
Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division may impose a penalty against the 
employer under this Subsection (2): 
(i) subject to the notice and other requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act; and 
(ii) if the division believes that an employer of one or more employees is 
conducting business without securing the payment of benefits in one of the three 
ways provided in Section 34A-2-201. 
(b) The penalty imposed under Subsection (2)(a) shall be the greater of: 
(i) $1,000; or 
(ii) three times the amount of the premium the employer would have paid for 
workers' compensation insurance based on the rate filing of the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah during the period of noncompliance. 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (2)(b)(ii), the premium is calculated by applying 
rates and rate multipliers to the payroll basis undeY Subsection (2)(d), using the 
highest rated employee class code applicable to the employer's operations. 
(d) The payroll basis for the purpose of calculating the premium penalty shall be 
150% of the state's average weekly wage multiplied by the highest number of 
workers employed by the employer during the period of the employer's 
noncompliance multiplied by the number of weeks of the employer's 
noncompliance up to a maximum of 156 weeks. 
While the imposition of penalty is discretionary with the Industrial Accidents Division, the 
amount of penalty is fixed by the foregoing statute and cannot be altered. 
In challenging the noncompliance penalty imposed against it, Anabasis does not deny that 
it had employees during the period in question, nor does it claim to be exempt from the Act's 
coverage requirements or that it complied with those coverage requirements. Instead, Anabasis 
argues no penalty can be imposed because it obtained coverage prior to the date the Division 
actually assessed the penalty. In other words, Anabasis argues that the statutory penalty can be 
imposed only for continuing lapses of coverage. The entire justification for Anabasis's argument 
is found in §34A-2-21 l(2)(a)(ii), authorizing the Division to impose a penalty "if the Division 
believes that an employer... is conducting business" without coverage. (Emphasis added.) 
In considering Anabasis's argument, it is appropriate to read §34 A-2-211 (2) in its entirety, 
rather than focus on a single passage out of context. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Cathco 
v Valentine Crane Brunies Onvon Architect 944 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah 1997): "It is well 
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established that a statute should be read as a whole." Similarly, in Andrus v. Allred. 17 Utah 2d 
106, 109 (Utah 1965) the Court stated: 
(O)ne of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that the statute should 
be looked at as a whole and in the light of the general purpose it was intended to 
serve; and should be so interpreted and applied as to accomplish that objective. 
(Footnote omitted.) In order to give the statute the implementation which will 
fulfill its purpose, reason and intention sometimes prevail over technically applied 
literalness. 
The language of §34A-2-211(2), when read as a whole and in light of its intended purpose, 
indicates its operation is not confined only to continuing violations, but also applies to instances 
of past violations. For example, various subsections of §34A-2-211(2) refer to "the period of 
noncompliance," which suggests circumstances where the beginning date and ending date of the 
employer's noncompliance is known. The Appeals Board therefore concludes that §34A-2-211 (2) 
permits penalties against employers who have failed to maintain coverage, whether or not the 
employer has later obtained coverage. 
Anabasis also argues that an inadequate factual basis exists to support the Division's 
exercise of discretion in penalizing Anabasis. The Appeals Board finds no merit to this argument. 
To the contrary, the basis for the Division's imposition of penalty against Anabasis has been set 
forth in the orders of the Division and the ALJ, as well as in this decision. Furthermore, Anabasis 
does not challenge any of the facts on which the penalty is based. Under these circumstances, 
there has been no abuse of discretion in the imposition of penalty against Anabasis pursuant to 
§34A-2-211(2). 
In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that under the admitted facts of this case, §34A-
2-211(2) of the Act authorizes imposition of a $1,000 penalty against Anabasis. 
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The Appeals Board affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Anabasis's motion for review. 
It is so ordered 
Dated this £ day of August, 2000 
Patricia S. Drawe 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order 
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Utah Code Annotated 
34A-1 -303 Review of administrative decision. 
(1) A decision entered by an administrative law judge under this title 
is the final order of the commission unless a further appeal is initiated under 
this title and in accordance with the rules of the commission governing the 
review. 
(2) (a) Unless otherwise provided, a person who is entitled to appeal 
a decision of an administrative law judge under this title, may appeal the 
decision by filing a motion for review with the Division of Adjudication. 
(b) Unless a party in interest to the appeal requests in accordance 
with Subsection (3) that the appeal be heard by the Appeals Board, the 
commissioner shall hear the review in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act. A decision of the commissioner is a final order 
of the commission unless set aside by the court of appeals. 
(c) (i) If in accordance with Subsection (3) a party in interest to the 
appeal requests that the appeal be heard by the Appeals Board, the Appeals 
Board shall hear the review in accordance with: 
(A) Section 34A-1-205; and 
(B) Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(ii) A decision of the Appeals Board is a final order of the commission 
unless set aside by the court of appeals. 
(3) A party in interest may request that an appeal be heard by the 
Appeals Board by filing the request with the Division of Adjudication: 
(a) as part of the motion for review; or 
(b) if requested by a party in interest who did not file a motion for 
review, within 20 days of the date the motion for review is filed with the 
Division of Adjudication. 
(4) (a) On appeal, the commissioner or the Appeals Board may: 
(i) affirm the decision of an administrative law judge; 
(ii) modify the decision of an administrative law judge; 
(iii) return the case to an administrative law judge for further action as 
directed; or 
(iv) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of an 
administrative law judge. 
(b) The commissioner or Appeals Board may not conduct a trial de 
novo of the case. 
(c) The commissioner or Appeals Board may base its decision on: 
(i) the evidence previously submitted in the case; or 
(ii) on written argument or written supplemental evidence requested 
by the commissioner or Appeals Board. 
(d) The commissioner or Appeals Board may permit the parties to: 
(i) file briefs or other papers; or 
(ii) conduct oral argument. 
(e) The commissioner or Appeals Board shall promptly notify the 
parties to any proceedings before it of its decision, including its findings and 
conclusions. 
(5) (a) A member of the Appeals Board may not participate in any 
case in which the member is an interested party. Each decision of a member of 
the Appeals Board shall represent the member's independent judgment. 
(b) If a member of the Appeals Board may not participate in a case 
because the member is an interested party, the two members of the Appeals 
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Board that may hear the case shall assign an individual to participate as a 
member of the board in that case if the individual: 
(i) is not a interested party in the case; and 
(ii) was not previously assigned to preside over any proceeding or 
take any administrative action related to the case. 
(6) If an order is appealed to the court of appeals after the party 
appealing the order has exhausted all administrative appeals, the court of 
appeals has jurisdiction to: 
(a) review, reverse, remand, or annul any order of the commissioner or 
Appeals Board; or 
(b) suspend or delay the operation or execution of the order of the 
commissioner or Appeals Board being appealed. 
Enacted by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session. 
34A-2-210 Power to bring suit for noncompliance. 
(1) (a) The commission or the division on behalf of the commission 
may maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin any employer, within 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, from further 
operation of the employer's business, when the employer fails to provide for 
the payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in Section 34A-2-
201. 
(b) Upon a showing of failure to provide for the payment of benefits, 
the court shall enjoin the further operation of the employer's business until the 
payment of these benefits has been secured by the employer as required by 
Section 34A-2-201. The court may enjoin the employer without requiring 
bond from the commission or division. 
(2) If the division has reason to believe that an employer is 
conducting a business without securing the payment of compensation in one 
of the three ways provided in Section 34A-2-201, the division may give the 
employer five aays written notice by registered mail of the noncompliance 
and if the employer within the five days written notice does not remedy the 
default: 
(a) the commission or the division on behalf of the commission may 
file suit under Subsection (1); and 
(b) the court may, ex parte, issue without bond a temporary 
injunction restraining the further operation of the employer's business. 
Enacted by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session 
34A-2-211 Notice of noncompliance to employer - Enforcement power 
of division — Penalty. 
(1) (a) In addition to the remedies specified in Section 34A-2-21G, if 
the division has reason to believe that an employer is conducting business 
without securing the payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided 
in Section 34A-2-201, the division may give that employer written notice of 
the noncompliance by certified mail to the last-known address of the 
employer. 
(b) If the employer does not remedy the default within 15 days after 
delivery of the notice, the division may issue an order requiring the employer 
to appear before the division and show cause why the employer should not 
be ordered to comply with Section 34A-2-201. 
c) If it is found that the employer has failed to provide for the 
payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in Section 34A-2-201, 
the division may require any employer to comply with Section 34A-2-201. 
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(2) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division may impose a 
penalty against the employer under this Subsection (2): 
(I) subject to the notice and other requirements of Title 63, Chapter 
46b, Administrative Procedures Act; and 
(ii) if the division believes that an employer of one or more employees 
is conducting business without securing the payment of benefits in one of the 
three ways provided in Section 34A-2-201. 
(b) The penalty imposed under Subsection (2)(a) shall be the greater 
of: 
(i) $1,000; or 
(ii) three times the amount of the premium the employer would have 
paid for workers' compensation insurance based on the rate filing of the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah during the period of noncompliance. 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (2)(b)(ii), the premium is calculated by 
applying rates and rate multipliers to the payroll basis under Subsection (2)(d), 
using the highest rated employee class code applicable to the employer's 
operations. 
(d) The payroll basis for the purpose of calculating the premium 
penalty shall be 150% of the state's average weekly wage multiplied by the 
highest number of workers employed by the employer during the period of 
the employer's noncompliance multiplied by the number of weeks of the 
employer's noncompliance up to a maximum of 156 weeks. 
(3) The penalty imposed under Subsection (2) shall be deposited in 
the Uninsured Employers' Fund created by Section 34A-2-704 and used for 
the purposes of that fund. 
(4) (a) An employer who disputes the determination, imposition, or 
amount of a penalty imposed under Subsection (2) shall request a hearing 
before an administrative law judge within 30 days of the date of issuance of 
the administrative action imposing the penalty or the administrative action 
becomes a final order of the commission. 
(b) The employer's request for a hearing under Subsection (4)(a) shall 
specify the facts and grounds that are the basis of the employer's objection to 
the determination, imposition, or amount of the penalty. 
(c) An administrative law judge's decision under this Subsection (4) 
may be reviewed pursuant to Part 8, Adjudication. 
(5) (a) After a penalty has been issued and becomes a final order of 
the commission the division on behalf of the commission may file an abstract 
for any uncollected penalty in the district court. 
(b) The abstract filed under Subsection (5)(a) shall state: 
(i) the amount of the uncollected penalty; 
(ii) reasonable attorneys' fees; 
(iii) costs of collection; and 
(iv) court costs. 
(c) The filed abstract shall have the effect of a judgment of that court. 
(6) Any administrative action issued by the division under this 
section shall: 
(a) be in writing; 
(b) be sent by certified mail to the last-known address of the 
employer; 
(c) state the findings and administrative action of the division; and 
(d) specify its effective date, which may be immediate or may be at a 
later date. 
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(7) The final order of the commission under this section, upon 
application by the division on behalf of the commission made on or after the 
effective date of the order to a court of general jurisdiction in any county in 
this state, may be enforced by an order to comply entered ex parte and 
without notice by the court. 
Amended by Chapter 13, 1998 General Session 
34A-2-417 Claims and benefits - Time limits for filing — Burden of proof 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability 
cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of three 
consecutive years the employee does not: 
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial 
accident; and 
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer 
or insurance carrier for payment. 
(2) (a) A claim described in Subsection (2)(b) is barred, unless the 
employee: 
(i) files an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication 
no later than six years from the date of the accident; and 
(ii) by no later than 12 years from the date of the accident, is able to 
meet the employee's burden of proving that the employee is due the 
compensation claimed under this chapter. 
(b) Subsection (2)(a) applies to a claim for compensation for: 
(i) temporary total disability benefits; 
(ii) temporary partial disability benefits; 
(iii) permanent partial disability benefits; or 
(iv) permanent total disability benefits. 
(c) The commission may enter an order awarding or denying an 
employee's claim for compensation under this chapter within a reasonable 
time period beyond 12 years from the date of the accident, if: 
(i) the employee complies with Subsections (2)(a)(i) and (ii); and 
(ii) 12 years from the date of the accident: 
(A) (I) the employee is fully cooperating in a commission approved 
reemployment plan; and 
(II) the results of that commission approved reemployment plan are 
not known; or 
(B) the employee is actively adjudicating issues of compensability 
before the commission. 
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for 
hearing is filed within one year of the date of death of the employee. 
(4) (a) (i) Subject to Subsections (2)(c) and (4)(b), after an employee 
files an application for hearing within six years from the date of the accident, 
the Division of Adjudication may enter an order to show cause why the 
employee's claim should not be dismissed because the employee has failed to 
meet the employee's burden of proof to establish an entitlement to 
compensation claimed in the application for hearing. 
(ii) The order described in Subsection (4)(a)(i) may be entered on the 
motion of the: 
(A) Division of Adjudication; 
(B) employee's employer; or 
(C) employer's insurance carrier. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a), the Division of Adjudication may dismiss 
a claim: 
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(i) without prejudice; or 
(ii) with prejudice only if: 
(A) the Division of Adjudication adjudicates the merits of the 
employee's entitlement to the compensation claimed in the application for 
hearing; or 
(B) the employee fails to comply with Subsection (2)(a)(ii). 
(c) If a claim is dismissed without prejudice under Subsection (4)(b), 
the employee is subject to the time limits under Subsection (2)(a) to claim 
compensation under this chapter. 
Amended by Chapter 261, 1999 General Session 
34A-2-704 Uninsured Employers1 Fund. 
(1) (a) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund. The Uninsured 
Employers' Fund has the purpose of assisting in the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits to any person entitled to the benefits, if: 
(i) that person's employer: 
(A) is individually, jointly, or severally liable to pay the benefits; and 
(B) (I) becomes or is insolvent; 
(II) appoints or has appointed a receiver; or 
(III) otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or 
other security to cover workers' compensation liabilities; and 
(ii) the employment relationship between that person and the 
person's employer is localized within the state as provided in Subsection (20). 
(b) The Uninsured Employers' Fund succeeds to all monies previously 
held in the Default Indemnity Fund. 
(c) If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund is liable for all obligations of the employer as set forth in this chapter 
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, with the exception of 
penalties on those obligations. 
(2) (a) Monies for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be deposited 
into the Uninsured Employers' Fund in accordance with Subsection 59-9-
101(2). 
(b) The commissioner shall appoint an administrator of the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund. 
(c) The state treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund, and the administrator shall make provisions for and direct its 
distribution. 
(3) Reasonable costs of administering the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund or other fees required to be paid by the Uninsured Employers' Fund may 
be paid from the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(4) The state treasurer snail: 
(a) receive workers' compensation premium assessments from the 
State Tax Commission; and 
(b) invest the Uninsured Employers' Fund to ensure maximum 
investment return for both long and short term investments in accordance 
with Section 51-7-12.5. 
(5) (a) The administrator may employ, retain, or appoint counsel to 
represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in all proceedings brought to 
enforce claims against or on behalf of the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(b) If requested by the commission, the following shall aid in the 
representation of the Uninsured Employers' Fund: 
(i) the attorney general; or 
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(ii) the city attorney, or county attorney of the locality in which: 
(A) any investigation, hearing, or trial under this chapter or Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act, is pending; 
(B) the employee resides; or 
(C) an employer: 
(I) resides; or 
(II) is doing business. 
(6) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or 
payable to or on behalf of an employee or the employee's dependents from 
the Uninsured Employers' Funa, the Uninsured Employers' Fund, by 
subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and benefits of the employfee or the 
employee's dependents against the employer failing to make the 
compensation payments. 
(7) (a) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an 
insolvent employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(b) The court with jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under 
this section a priority equal to that to which the claimant would have been 
entitled in the absence of this section against the assets of the insolvent 
employer. 
(c) The expenses of the Uninsured Employers' Fund in handling 
claims shall be accorded the same priority as the liquidator's expenses. 
(8) (a) The administrator shall periodically file with the receiver, 
trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier: 
(i) statements of the covered claims paid by the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund; and 
(ii) estimates of anticipated claims against the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund. 
(b) The filings under Subsection (8)(a) shall preserve the rights of the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund for claims against the assets of the insolvent 
employer. 
(9) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable 
from the Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or 
neglect of another person not in the same employment, the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund has the same rights as allowed under Section 34A-2-106. 
(10) The Uninsured Employers' Fund, subject to approval of the 
administrator, shall discharge its obligations by: 
(a) adjusting its own claims; or 
(b) contracting with an adjusting company, risk management 
company, insurance company, or other company that has expertise and 
capabilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims. 
(11) (a) For the purpose of maintaining the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund, an administrative law judge, upon rendering a decision with respect to 
any claim for workers' compensation benefits in which an uninsured employer 
was duly joined as a party, shall: 
(l) order the uninsured employer to reimburse the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund for all benefits paid to or on behalf of an injured employee 
by the Uninsured Employers' Fund along with interest, costs, and attorneys' 
fees; and 
(ii) impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the 
value of the total award in connection with the claim tnat shall be paid into 
the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(b) Awards may be docketed as other awards under this chapter and 
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Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(12) The liability of the state, the commission, and the state treasurer, 
with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees, or 
disbursement properly chargeable against the Uninsured Employers' Fund, is 
limited to the assets in the Uninsured Employers' Fund, and they are not 
otherwise in any way liable for the making of any payment. 
(13) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing 
and payment of claims for compensation from the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund. 
(14) (a) If it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers' Fund to 
pay benefits under this section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured, 
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund may assess all other self-insured 
employers amounts necessary to pay: 
(i) the obligations of the Uninsured Employers' Fund subsequent to 
an insolvency; 
(ii) the expenses of handling covered claims subsequent to an 
insolvency; 
(iii) the cost of examinations under Subsection (15); and 
(iv) other expenses authorized by this section. 
(b) The assessments of each self-insured employer shall be in the 
proportion that the manual premium of the self-insured employer for the 
preceding calendar year bears to the manual premium of all self-insured 
employers for the preceding calendar year. 
(c) Each self-insured employer shall be notified of the employer's 
assessment not later than 30 days before the assessment is due. 
(d) (i) A self-insured employer may not be assessed in any year an 
amount greater than 2% of that selt-insurea employer's manual premium for 
the preceding calendar year. 
(ii) u the maximum assessment does not provide in any one year an 
amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from tne Uninsured 
Employers' Fund for one or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid 
portion shall be paid as soon as funds become available. 
(e) All self-insured employers are liable under this section for a period 
not to exceed three years after the self-insured employer's voluntary or 
involuntary termination of self-insurance privileges within this state. 
(f) This Subsection (14) does not apply to claims made against an 
insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior to July 1, 
1986. 
(15) (a) A self-insured employer shall notify the division of any 
information indicating that any self-insured employer may be insolvent or in a 
financial condition hazardous to its employees or the public. 
(b) Upon receipt of the notification described in Subsection (15)(a) 
and with gooa cause appearing, the division may order an examination of that 
self-insured employer. 
(c) The cost of the examination ordered under Subsection (15)(b) 
shall be assessed against all self-insured employers as provided in Subsection 
(14). 
(d) The results of the examination ordered under Subsection (15)(b) 
shall be kept confidential. 
(16) In any claim against an employer by the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund, or by or on behalf of the employee to whom or to whose dependents 
compensation and other benefits are paid or payable from the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund, the burden of proof is on the employer or other party in 
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interest objecting to the claim. The claim is presumed to be valid up to the full 
amount 01 workers' compensation benefits claimed by the employee or the 
employee's dependents. This Subsection (16) applies whether the claim is filed 
in court or in an adjudicative proceeding under the authority of the 
commission. 
(17) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship 
may not recover compensation or other benefits from the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund if: 
(a) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection 34A-
2-104(3); or (b) the person is included as an employee under Subsection 34A-
2-104(3), but: " * 
(i) the person's employer fails to insure or otherwise provide adequate 
payment of direct compensation; and 
(ii) the failure described in Subsection (17)(b)(i) is attributable to an 
act or omission over which the person had or shared control or responsibility. 
(18) A director or officer of a corporation may not recover 
compensation or other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund if the 
director or officer is excluded from coverage under Subsection 34A-2-104(4). 
(19) The Uninsured Employers' Fund: 
(a) shall be: 
(i) used in accordance with this section only for: 
(A) the purpose of assisting in the payment of workers' compensation 
benefits in accordance with Subsection (1); and 
(B) in accordance with Subsection (3), payment of: 
(I) reasonable costs of administering the Uninsured Employers' Fund; 
or 
(II) fees required to be paid by the Uninsured Employers' Fund; and 
(ii) expended according to processes that can be verified by audit; 
and 
(b) may not be used for: 
(i) administrative costs unrelated to the Uninsured Employers' Fund; 
or 
(ii) any activity of the commission other than an activity described in 
Subsection (19)(a). 
(20) (a) For purposes of Subsection (1), an employment relationship is 
localized in the state if: 
(i) (A) the employer who is liable for the benefits has a business 
premise in the state; and 
(B) (I) the contract for hire is entered into in the state; or 
(II) the employee regularly performs work duties in the state for the 
employer who is liable for the benefits; or 
(ii) the employee is: 
(A) a resident of the state; and 
(B) regularly performs work duties in the state for the employer who 
is liable for the benefits. 
(b) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, the commission shall by rule define what constitutes 
regularly performing work duties in the state. 
Amended by Chapter 183, 2000 General Session 
63-46b-16 Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of 
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Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by 
the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that: - > 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been 
substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency 
action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any 
statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-
making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as 
a decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light oi the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(ill) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies 
the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
78-27a-l Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Small Business Equal Access to Justice Act." 
Enacted by Chapter 298, 1983 General Session 
78-27a-3 Definitions. As used in this act: 
(1) "Prevail" means to obtain favorable final judgment, the right to all 
appeals having been exhausted, on the merits, on substantially all counts or 
charges in the action and with respect to the most significant issue or set of 
issues presented, but does not include the settlement of any action, either by 
stipulation, consent decree or otherwise, whether or not settlement occurs 
Addendum page 54 
before or after any hearing or trial. 
(2) "Reasonable litigation expenses" means court costs, 
administrative hearing costs, attorney's fees, and witness fees of all necessary 
witnesses, not in excess of $10,000, which a court finds were reasonably 
incurred in opposing action covered under this act. 
(3) "Small business" means a commercial or business entity, including 
a sole proprietorship, which does not have more than 250 employees, but 
does not include an entity which is a subsidiary or affiliate of another entity 
which is not a small business. 
(4) "State" means any department, board, institution, hospital, college, 
or university of the state of Utah or any political subdivision thereof, except 
with respect to antitrust actions brought under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 9. 
Enacted by Chapter 298, 1983 General Session 
78-27a-5 Litigation expense award authorized in appeals from 
administrative decisions. 
(1) In any civil judicial appeal taken from an administrative decision 
regarding a matter in which the administrative action was commenced by the 
state, and which involves the business regulatory functions of the state, a 
court may award reasonable litigation expenses to any small business which is 
a named party if the small business prevails in the appeal and the court finds 
that the state action was undertaken without substantial justification. 
(2) Arty state agency or political subdivision may require by rule or 
ordinance that a small business exhaust administrative remedies prior to 
making a claim under this act. 
Enacted by Chapter 298, 1983 General Session 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to 
court; sanctions. 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall 
be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, 
or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. 
Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. 
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings 
need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be 
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being 
called to the attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written 
motion, or other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or 
later advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the 
best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are 
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary 
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support 
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after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence 
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or 
belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to 
respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court 
may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction 
upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or 
are responsible for the violation. 
(1) How initiated. 
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made 
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific 
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in 
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may 
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or 
aenial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court 
may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and 
attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate 
circumstances, a law firm may fe held jointly responsible for violations 
committed by its partners, memtiers, and employees. 
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an 
order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision 
(b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it 
has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation 
of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such 
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the 
limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or 
include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into 
court, or, if imposed on motion ana warranted for effective deterrence, an 
order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable 
attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented 
party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative 
unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or 
settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose 
attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the 
conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis 
for the sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this 
rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, 
and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37. 
Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-505. Attorney fees affidavits. 
Intent: To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for 
affidavits in support of attorney fees. 
Applicability: This rule shall govern the award of attorney fees in the 
trial courts. 
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Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed 
with the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the 
nature of the work performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to 
prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter to 
the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of 
the fees for comparable legal services. 
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other 
than attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed. 
(3) If the affidavit is in support of attorney fees for services rendered 
to a person or entity who has been assigned an interest in a claim for the 
purpose of collection or hired by the obligee to collect a debt, the affidavit 
shall also state that the attorney is not sharing the fee or any portion thereof 
in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 5A 
(4) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it 
is expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following 
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the 
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred 
in pursuit of collection: 
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL 
BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY 
EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY 
AFFIDAVIT." 
(5) Attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule or pursuant to 
Rule 4-505.1. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted' 
by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gam time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon 
its own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the 
appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause 
why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set 
forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least 
ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause 
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shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, 
the court shall grant a hearing. 
Rule 34. Award of costs. 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an 
appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is 
affirmed, costs shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order isreversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless 
otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is 
vacated, costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be 
allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the 
state of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an award of costs for or against 
the state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or 
prohibited by law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other expenses 
on appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing 
party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or 
memoranda and attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs 
incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, including costs of 
the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid 
for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees 
for filing and docketing the appeal. 
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. A party claiming costs shall, 
within 15 days after the remittitur is filed with the clerk of the trial court, serve 
upon the adverse party and file with the clerk of the trial court an itemized 
and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days of service of 
the bill of costs, serve and file a notice of objection, together with a motion to 
have the costs taxed by the trial court. If there is no objection to the cost bill 
within the allotted time, the clerk of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed 
and enter judgment for the party entitled thereto, which judgment shall be 
entered in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the case 
of other judgments of record. If the cost bill of the prevailing party is timely 
opposed, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs 
and enter a final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be 
entered in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in tne case 
of other judgments of record. The determination of the clerk shall be 
reviewable by the trial court upon the request of either party made within 5 
days of the entry of the judgment. 
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other 
matters before the court, including appeals from an agency,costs may be 
allowed as in cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after the 
expiration of the time in which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 
13 days after an order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have 
been awarded may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon 
the adverse party an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, 
within 5 days after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection and 
a motion to have the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is 
filed within the allotted time, the clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to the 
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cost bill, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and 
settle the costs, tax the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against 
the adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the 
court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of 
judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be permitted. A 
judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in 
the state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and 
with the same force and effect as judgments of the district court. 
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